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"YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS!": A REPLY TO PROFESSORS
BALKIN AND LEVINSON
© 1999 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS*

In their contribution to this symposium- Getting Serious About
"Taking Legal Reasoning Seriously," Professors Balkin and Levinson
provide an account of my understanding of "taking legal reasoning
seriously" and argue that my positions on both this concept and the
concept "morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture" are called
into question if not refuted by two alleged facts:
(1) "aside from [Markovits] and (possibly) an earlier incarnation of
Ronald Dworkin," no one thinks that various actors in the legal
system are supposed to "take[] legal reasoning seriously in the
way that [Markovits] thinks they should"' and
(2) in our culture, law-role players generally do not act in the way
that Markovits' conclusions about legitimate legal argument
imply they are obligated to behave.
This Reply responds to these contentions. Part I analyzes Balkin
and Levinson's critique of my understanding of "taking legal
argument seriously" and comments on their own use of this
expression. Part I begins by articulating my conclusions about the
various senses in which someone can appropriately be said to be
"taking legal argument seriously." It then refutes Balkin and
Levinson's claim that I equate "taking legal reasoning seriously" (in
my words, "taking legal argument seriously") with agreeing with my
conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture.
Next, Part I argues that the preceding error led Balkin and Levinson
to mischaracterize my position on the work of various jurisprudential
scholars with whom I disagree. After that, Part I illustrates the
difference between the ways in which I and Balkin and Levinson use
* Lloyd M. Bentson, Jr. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School;
B.A., Cornell University (1963); Ph.D., London School of Economics (1966); LL.B., Yale
University (1968); M.A., Oxford University (1981).
The author would like to thank John McEnroe for the title and Daniel S. Markovits, Inga
Markovits, and Michael Sean Quinn for their comments and suggestions.
1. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious About "Taking Legal Reasoning
Seriously", 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543, 545 (1999).
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"taking legal reasoning seriously" by examining their assertions about
how the participants in three hypothetical legal debates they describe
would characterize each other's positions in "taking legal reasoning
seriously" terms. Finally, Part I responds to Balkin and Levinson's
criticism that my usage of "taking legal reasoning seriously" does not
reflect the difference in the legal arguments that different legal-role
players are obligated to make or heed.
Part II argues that Balkin and Levinson's supposed empirical
refutation of my conclusions about morally-legitimate argument in
our culture is not persuasive. Before outlining the four basic
deficiencies of Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique of my
jurisprudential position, I will outline my position on morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture:
(1) Using a particular type of argument to determine the content of
existing law is morally legitimate in a given culture if and only if
doing so is consistent with that culture's moral commitments.
(2) Ours is a liberal, rights-based culture:
(A) members of our culture engage in two kinds of prescriptive
moral discourse- "moral-ought talk" (which is based on
personally-chosen moral norms that I denominate "personal
ultimate values") and "moral-rights talk" (which is
grounded on moral norms that I denominate "moral
principles" that individuals do not choose for themselves but
are obligated by their membership in our culture to use
when making and assessing moral-rights claims);
(B) in our culture, an individual cannot excuse or justicize
(demonstrate the justness of) a choice that violates
someone's moral rights by demonstrating that it is consistent
with the personal ultimate values to which the individual
subscribed, and the State cannot excuse or justicize a choice
that violates someone's moral rights by demonstrating that it
helps the State achieve one or more goals it is authorized to
pursue; and
(C) members of our culture and our State are committed to
grounding their moral-rights decisions on the liberal duty to
show appropriate, equal respect and concern for all moralrights holders for whom they are or it is responsible (inter
alia, concern for these creatures' actualizing their potential
to become and remain persons of moral integrity by taking
their obligations seriously and striving to establish a
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reflective equilibrium between their personal valueconvictions and their conduct).
(3) In our culture, arguments derived from this liberal duty (which I
denominate "arguments of moral principle") dominate morallylegitimate legal argument and (with one exception) valid legal
argument in our culture. Arguments of moral principle control
legitimate legal argument in two ways: (A) they apply directly in
all cases in which the asserted legal right derives from a
purported moral right and (B) they apply indirectly in all cases to
determine the legitimacy and (with that exception) the validity of
using the other general modes of argument members of our
culture have used or may use to establish what the law is, the
variants of each general type of argument that can be
legitimately or (with that exception) validly used to discover the
law, and the correct relationship between each valid subtype of
legal argument and the internally-right answer to the relevant
legal-rights question.2
(4) The fact that arguments of moral principle dominate morallylegitimate legal discourse and (with one exception) valid legal
discourse in our culture implies the existence of internally-right
answers to all legal-rights questions. The dominance of
arguments of moral principle produces this result both by
rendering legally irrelevant (because morally illegitimate) some
prudential arguments that favor a different conclusion from the
one supported by the other, legitimate modes of legal argument
and by co-opting the other modes of legitimate legal argument
(textual, historical, structural, and precedential/practice-based
2. The exception is that textual argument based on a clear constitutional text whose
concrete consequences were understood by its ratifiers at the time of the ratification (though
they may not have grasped the moral illegitimacy of the provision in question) trumps
arguments of moral principle. In other words, in this case, an argument may be legally "valid"
(i.e., its use to determine extant legal rights may be correct) even though its use is morally
illegitimate, and the legal-rights conclusion to which it leads may be internally correct even
though it is inconsistent with the moral commitments of the society in question. For a more
detailed summary of my position on morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture, see
section L.A of Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415 (1999) [hereinafter Legitimate Legal
Argument]. I readily acknowledge that in our culture the morally-legitimate way to determine
the internally-correct answer to a legal-rights question may depend on whether the relevant
legal right is a fundamental-fairness-related constitutional right, derives from an institutional
arrangement that the Constitution creates that was not required by our society's moral
commitments, is a common-law right, or derives from a statute that was not passed to secure
anyone's moral rights. For a more detailed discussion of these distinctions, see Richard S.
Markovits, Legitimate Legal Interpretation,Moral Principles, and Internally-Right Answers to
Legal-Rights Questions, in 6 GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 1999).
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legal argument) that might otherwise favor different conclusions
or a conclusion that is inconsistent with our basic moral principle.
The fact that textual arguments based on morally-illegitimate
constitutional texts may sometimes be legally valid does not
undermine the conclusion that there are internally-right answers
to all legal-rights questions in our culture: when such morallyillegitimate textual arguments are valid, there will still be
internally-right answers to the legal-rights questions posed-the
morally-illegitimate answer favored by the morally-illegitimate
though legally-valid textual argument in question.
Balkin and Levinson claim that my jurisprudential position is
refuted by its inconsistency with both the actual conduct of various
law-role players in our culture and the informed beliefs of members
of our culture about the obligations of these law-role players. Part II
argues that for the following four reasons Balkin and Levinson's
empirical attack on my position fails.
First, Balkin and Levinson to the contrary notwithstanding, my
conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture do
not imply that lawyers should make only those arguments they
believe to be correct, that law-teachers should teach only those legal
arguments whose use they think would be morally legitimate in our
culture (or a fortiori, only those arguments that I believe can be
legitimately used in our culture to discover what the law is), that
drafters or enactors of new legislation or regulations have the same
obligations as judges who are supposed to be discovering what the
law is rather than creating new law in the sense of legislating, or that
judges should ignore precedent whenever they conclude that the
opinion in which it was set was wrong as a matter of first impression.
Second, Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique of my position
is undermined by the inaccuracy or contestability of some of their
empirical claims. Neither legal scholarship nor legal practice is as
divorced from morally-legitimate legal argument as they assert, and
the percentage of informed members of the community who find it
appropriate to use arguments of moral principle to discover what the
law is is far higher than Balkin and Levinson appear to suppose.
Third, the strength of Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique of
my conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our
culture is vitiated by the existence of persuasive explanations of some
of the facts that are not consistent with my claims. More specifically,
the failure of various parts of the legal community to accept that my
type of antipositivism captures our society's moral commitments and
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the reluctance of judges and scholars to own up to the extent to which
they are being influenced by arguments of moral principle or their
understanding of the substance and adjudicatory relevance of our
society's moral commitments can at least partially be explained by
their never having had instruction in the methodology of their
discipline, by their failure to distinguish between what I call "personal
ultimate values" and "moral principles," and by the bad name that
Lochner3 and its progeny gave to all moral-norm-oriented legal
arguments.
Fourth and finally, Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique is
undermined by the fact that even if the inconsistencies on which it
focuses were present and unsatisfactorily explicable they would be far
less damaging to my position than Balkin and Levinson suppose.
Balkin and Levinson's mistaken belief that legal practice is morally
self-legitimating and their related conflation of "socially-accepted"
legal argument and morally-legitimate legal argument causes them to
overestimate the extent to which the allegedly-unsatisfactorilyexplicable non-fits on which they focus would undermine my position.
I claim that (1) a legal practice is morally legitimate in a rights-based
culture such as ours only if it is consistent with that culture's moralrights commitments and (2) the moral-rights commitments of such a
culture must be inferred from its members' moral-rights-related
behaviors and beliefs, of which its members' legal-rights-related
behaviors and beliefs form only a small part. If I am right as a matter
of philosophy, the non-fits whose existence Balkin and Levinson
assert would be less harmful to my position than they claim. Thus,
even if Balkin and Levinson could come up with an alternative
account of our society's moral character and commitments that
"discounted-fit" its members' legal-rights-related conduct and beliefs
better than does my account (i.e., fit such conduct and beliefs better,
taking into consideration the explicability of the relevant non-fits),
my account would rank higher on the relevant combination of fit and
"explicability of non-fit" criteria if (as I am supposing) its "discounted
fit" to the relevant individuals' moral-rights-related conduct and
beliefs was superior. And even if my accounts of our society's
prescriptive
moral commitments
and their jurisprudential
implications "discounted fit" its members' law-role conduct and lawrole beliefs so poorly that one would have to conclude that ours was
an amoral culture if the facts that the relevant account was supposed
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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to fit were all law-role-related facts, my account's "discounted fit" to
the broader set of all prescriptive moral conduct and beliefs might be
good enough to defeat such a conclusion.
I. "TAKING LEGAL REASONING (ARGUMENT) SERIOUSLY"
A. My Understandingand Usage of This Concept
Balkin and Levinson's analysis of my usage of "taking legal
argument seriously" is partly influenced by the first sentence of the
draft of my Introduction to this symposium that I sent them when
soliciting their participation in this project. Since the counterpart
passage in this symposium's actual Introduction is far more elaborate,
fairness requires me to begin this section by quoting the neverpublished sentence to which they are responding:
There are at least two senses in which one can take legal argument
seriously: one can believe that in principle legal argument can
generate internally-right answers to legal-rights questions, and one
can value legal craftsmanship for either aesthetic or pragmatic
reasons.
The draft that Balkin and Levinson saw also contained a
footnote to the quoted passage that indicated that "taking legal
argument seriously" is not an all-or-nothing matter, that one can take
legal argument more or less seriously.
The text of the published Introduction is perfectly consistent with
the draft that Balkin and Levinson saw. It simply elaborates on the
two (actually three) senses of "taking legal argument seriously"
mentioned in the draft-which I will henceforth denominate the
"conviction," "pragmatic-craftsmanship," and "aesthetic-craftsmanship" senses-, delineates two additional senses of the expression that
the draft-Introduction did not mention (though its statement that
there are "at least two senses" of the relevant expression does allude
to their possible existence)-a "thoughtful consideration" or
"consideration" sense and a "social importance" sense, and reiterates
the fact that one can take legal argument more or less seriously.
More specifically, the published Introduction indicates that an
individual "takes a given culture's legal argument seriously"
(1) "in the 'conviction' sense if he believes in the determinacy of
both the moral legitimacy and validity of each argument that
might be employed to determine what the law is in that culture
and in the internal correctness of all answers that might be given
to all legal-rights questions that may arise in that culture (if he
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believes that objectively-determinable, valid legal argument can
generate internally-correct answers to all legal-rights questions in
' 4
the culture in question),
(2) "in a 'pragmatic-craftsmanship' sense if he believes that the
effectiveness of any argument that might be used to determine
what the law is in that culture will be increased if the argument is
well crafted and perceived to be a valid legal argument,"5
(3) "in a 'thoughtful consideration' or 'consideration' sense if he
carefully considers the possibility that the legitimacy and validity
of all arguments that might be used to determine what the law is
in a given culture may be determinate and that, in the culture in
question, there may be internally-correct answers to all legal' 6
rights questions,
(4) "in an 'aesthetic-craftsmanship' sense if he values well-crafted
legal arguments for aesthetic reasons, which he may do even if he
does not think that well-crafted legal arguments are more
effective on that account,"7 and
(5) "in a 'social importance' sense if he believes that the concepts or
phenomena 'morally legitimate and valid legal argument' are
socially important" for any of a number of possible reasons. 8
The published Introduction also repeats the draft's statement that one
can take legal argument more or less seriously in each of the above
senses.9
Now that I have quoted both the draft discussion of "taking legal
argument seriously" to which Balkin and Levinson were responding
and the more elaborate discussion of this concept my published
Introduction contains, I can proceed to analyze Balkin and Levinson's
critique of my usage.
B. Balkin and Levinson's Conflation of My Positionon "Taking Legal
Reasoning (Argument) Seriously" and My Positionon "Legitimate
Legal Argument in Our Culture"
According to Balkin and Levinson, I claim "that taking legal
4. Richard S. Markovits, Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction, 74 CHI.KENT L. REv. 317, 317 (1999) (footnote omitted).
5. Id. at 317-18.
6. Id. at 318 n.2.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 319 n.3.
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reasoning seriously requires a commitment to belief in objectively
right answers to questions of law that people can arrive at by
reasoning about and through certain rights and principles" 10 and that
even those who "believe in the relative autonomy of legal discourse
from politics-or from other academic disciplines ...do not take
legal reasoning sufficiently seriously" (deserve to be called "culpable
examples of legal apostasy") if they "fight shy of Professor
Markovits's particular theories about rights and right answers."' 1 In
fact, although I do think that (1) in all cultures the use of a legal
argument cannot be morally legitimate unless it is consistent with the
relevant society's moral commitments and (2) in our culture to be
morally legitimate the analysis of some types of legal rights must turn
on the liberal norm on which we are committed to grounding our
moral-rights discourse, I do not think that, in our culture, the morallylegitimate analysis of all sorts of legal rights must be dominated by
the liberal principle in question, and I do not equate "taking legal
reasoning (argument) seriously" in our culture with agreeing with my
conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture.
Nothing I wrote in the draft-Introduction Balkin and Levinson
saw or the Introduction to this symposium I actually published
supports Balkin and Levinson's account of my understanding of
"taking legal reasoning seriously." Thus, nothing suggests that I fail to
realize that an advocate can take legal argument seriously for
pragmatic, craftsmanship reasons-can recognize and respond to the
fact that advocacy about what the law is will often be more effective if
it employs the modes of argument whose use judges and their
company find "socially acceptable" (i.e., believe to be valid in this
context) -without subscribing to my position on morally-legitimate
legal argument in our culture or, indeed, without agreeing with the
judges' views on this issue either. Similarly, nothing suggests that I fail
to realize that someone can take legal argument seriously for
aesthetic, craftsmanship reasons without subscribing to my position
on morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture or, indeed, to the
position that there are internally-right answers to all, most, or any
legal-rights questions in our culture.
Of course, Balkin and Levinson would be correct in responding
that, in relation to our disagreement, these craftsmanship senses of
10. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 543.
11. Id. at 544. This implies that I claim that everyone with whom I disagree is not taking
legal argument seriously.
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"taking legal argument seriously" are not so important as the
"conviction" sense of this expression. However, Balkin and
Levinson's claim that I equate "taking legal reasoning seriously" in
the conviction sense of that expression with "agreeing with my
conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture" is
equally unsupportable. More specifically, for two reasons, one must
reject Balkin and Levinson's claim that, on my construction, one
cannot be taking legal argument seriously in the conviction sense of
that expression unless one agrees with my (alleged) conclusion that
internally-right answers to all legal-rights questions can be derived
from the basic, liberal moral principle to which I conclude our culture
is committed. First, Balkin and Levinson are wrong because I do not
claim that the internally-correct answers to all legal-rights questions
can be derived from our society's basic moral principle-i.e., because
I recognize both that the moral principles to which we are committed
cannot be used to establish the existence of many of our legal rights
(e.g., the existence of those legal rights that derive from
constitutional 12 or statutory provisions that our moral-rights
commitments do not obligate us to adopt or enact) and that legal
rights may be inconsistent with principle when constitutional
provisions are inconsistent with our moral-rights commitments. 3
Second, Balkin and Levinson are wrong because I recognize (indeed,
emphasize) that many cultures are not "rights-based" or "liberal" in
my sense of these concepts, that morally-legitimate legal argument in
cultures that are not rights-based or liberal would be different from
its counterpart in our culture, and that (perhaps most importantly in
this context) individuals who honestly believe that internally-right
answers to all (or any number of) legal-rights questions in our culture
can be derived from a principle that is different from the liberal
principle to which I think our culture is committed are also taking
legal argument seriously. 14 Thus, in my usage, individuals who think
12. For a partial list of constitutional rights that our culture's liberal moral commitments do
not require us to secure, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 77-78 (1998) [hereinafter
MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE].
13. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 2, at 415 n.1. In other words, I recognize
that in a society whose constitution imperfectly instantiates its moral commitments, there will be
a difference between morally-legitimate legal argument and valid legal argument.
14. Balkin and Levinson also misrepresent my operationalization of the "conviction" sense
of the expression "taking legal argument seriously" (and, by implication, of the "consideration"
sense of the expression as well). In particular, Balkin and Levinson leave the impression that I
measure the extent to which someone "takes legal argument seriously" in the conviction sense
in a dichotomized fashion, that I draw a strong distinction between taking legal argument
"sufficiently seriously" and "insufficiently seriously." More specifically, they write as if I
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that ours is a goal-based society that is committed to instantiating a
particular personal ultimate value as well as individuals who think
that ours is a rights-based society that is committed to grounding its
moral-rights discourse on a non-liberal moral norm such as
utilitarianism would also be said to be "taking legal argument 100%
seriously" in the "conviction" sense if they think that internally-right
answers can be generated to all legal-rights questions by using, inter
alia, the non-liberal moral norm to whose use they think our society is
committed.
Balkin and Levinson's claim that I equate "taking legal reasoning
seriously" with agreeing with my conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture is also inconsistent with the
fact that, in my usage, someone has taken legal reasoning seriously in
the consideration sense of that expression even if, after serious
consideration, he rejects my conclusions that in our culture (1) the
moral legitimacy and validity of the use of each argument that might
be employed to determine what the law is is determinate and (2) all
answers that might be given to any legal-rights question are either
internally correct or internally incorrect-indeed, even if in the end
he concludes that the concepts morally-legitimate legal argument,
valid legal argument, and internally-correct answers to legal-rights
questions are incoherent or have no referent in our culture. To be
fair, I should acknowledge that my failure to refer to the
consideration sense of "taking legal argument seriously" in the draft
of the Introduction to which Balkin and Levinson were responding
made it more difficult for Balkin and Levinson to anticipate that I
would say that such a person took legal argument seriously in the
consideration sense of that expression even though he did not take
legal argument seriously in the conviction sense of that concept.15
maintain that to be taking legal argument "sufficiently seriously" in this sense one must believe
in the existence of objective, internally-right answers to all legal-rights questions-that those
who believe that there may not be or are not such internally-right answers to even one legalrights question do not take legal argument "sufficiently seriously" in my "conviction" sense. In
fact, as both the draft-Introduction Balkin and Levinson saw and the published Introduction
indicate, I would not draw a sharp line between taking legal argument sufficiently and
insufficiently seriously in the conviction (or any other) sense. I would simply say that the extent
to which someone takes legal argument seriously in the conviction sense increases with the
importance of the arguments whose moral legitimacy or legal validity he believes are
determinate as well as with the importance of the legal-rights questions to which he believes
internally-right answers can in principle be found. Of course, I recognize the difficulty of
operationalizing this concept of "importance." For a discussion of this problem (in the context
of developing a metric for the importance of a non-fit), see MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note
12, at 25-27.
15. Indeed, that is precisely how I would characterize Lawrence Friedman's handling of
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Finally, Balkin and Levinson's claim that I equate "taking legal
argument seriously" with "agreeing with my conclusions about
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture" is also inconsistent
with my acknowledgment in this Reply that "taking legal argument
seriously" has a "social importance" sense as well as "conviction,"
"craftsmanship," and "consideration" senses. Obviously, I recognize
that someone who does not agree with my position on morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture may still believe that legal
reasoning (argument) is a socially-important phenomenon.
Admittedly, the draft of my Introduction to this symposium to
which Balkin and Levinson were responding did not mention the
"consideration" and "social importance" senses of "taking legal
argument seriously." However, its reference to the "conviction" and
two "craftsmanship" senses of "taking legal argument seriously"
should have made clear what this Reply's articulation of the
"consideration" and "social importance" senses of this expression
confirms: I do not equate "taking legal reasoning (argument)
seriously" with "agreeing with my conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture."
C. Balkin and Levinson's Misdescriptionof My Characterizationof
Most Legal Theorists with Whom I Disagree
Not surprisingly, Balkin and Levinson's erroneous conclusion
that I equate "taking legal argument seriously" with "agreeing with
my conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument in our
culture" has led them to mischaracterize my attitude toward the work
of many of the scholars who write about valid or legitimate legal
argument in our culture with whom I disagree. Space limitations and
considerations of reader patience preclude me from commenting on
the scholarship of most of these experts. However, the issue is
sufficiently important to warrant my characterizing the positions of a
few of the legal theorists Balkin and Levinson list.
I will begin with Ronald Dworkin. I certainly would not say that
Ronald Dworkin fails to take legal reasoning "sufficiently seriously."
In the consideration sense, Dworkin takes legal reasoning very
seriously indeed. He also seems to think that his account of valid legal
argument implies the existence of internally-right answers to all legal-

and attitude toward legal argument. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society
Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 529 (1999).
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rights questions. Although I reject this understanding of his position,16
there can be no doubt that he takes legal argument almost as
seriously as I in the conviction sense of this expression. True, in my
judgment, the account of valid legal discourse that Dworkin provides
in Law's Empire 7 and his more recent books and articles gives moralrights discourse too little a role, implicitly overestimates the
frequency with which internal evidence will be unable to reveal the
concrete moral-rights commitments of our culture, (relatedly)
explicitly exaggerates the frequency with which an evaluator will have
to make use of a "best light" criterion to reach conclusions about the
moral norms that are inside the law, misleadingly claims that the use
of a "best light" criterion does not involve the application of
"personal ultimate values" (my expression), naively assumes that one
will be able to infer our culture's official personal-ultimate-value
consensus or commitments from its governmental officials' official
acts, and incorrectly asserts that such personal-ultimate-value
commitments have gravitational force in legal argument. These are
serious disagreements, but they do not lead me to assert that Dworkin
does not take legal argument seriously in any sense of that expression.
I also do not think that Philip Bobbitt fails to take "legal
argument" "sufficiently seriously" in any sense of either of these
enquoted expressions. Bobbitt clearly takes legal argument seriously
in the consideration sense. Moreover, although he concludes that
there is no internally-right answer to many legal-rights questionsviz., to those to which different answers are favored by different
modes of legal argument or by different variants of a given mode of
legal argument that are utilized or perceived to be valid by some
(unspecified) requisite portion of the legal community, his
conclusions that it would be invalid to use some types of argument to
discover what the law is in our culture, that there are internally-right
answers to many legal-rights questions, and that there are some
internally-wrong answers to many of the legal-rights questions in our
culture for which there is no unique, internally-right answer in our
culture certainly would justify the conclusion that he takes legal
argument seriously in the conviction sense of that expression.
As I have indicated in both Legitimate Legal Argument and
Matters of Principle,81 do have several important disagreements with
16. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 2, at 451 n.43.
17. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).

18. See MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 184-88; Legitimate Legal Argument,
supra note 2, at 445-48.
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Bobbitt. Most basically, I think that he incorrectly assumes that legal
practice is self-legitimating, relatedly that he incorrectly rejects the
claim that the principles on which our society's moral-rights
commitments are grounded are inside the law (that he rejects this
claim to the extent that these principles are not captured by what he
calls "ethical" and "structural" argument), that he incorrectly rejects
a fortiori the claim that these principles form the basis of a mode of
legal argument (which I call "argument of moral principle") that
dominates morally-legitimate legal argument and (with one
exception) valid legal argument in our culture, and relatedly that he
incorrectly rejects my conclusion that there are internally-right
answers to all legal-rights questions in our culture. However, although
these disagreements are serious, they would never lead me to say that
Philip Bobbitt does not take legal argument seriously or "sufficiently
seriously" in any sense of those expressions.
As I have indicated as well both in Legitimate Legal Argument
and at much greater length in Matters of Principle,9 I also disagree
with the Strict Constructionists. However, although they clearly take
legal argument seriously in the conviction sense of that expression in
that they think that there are internally-right answers to all legalrights questions (many of which are generated by the kind of
negative-default rule discussed in the introduction to Part II of
Legitimate Legal Argument), I have some doubts about whether at
least some Strict Constructionists really should be said to be taking
legal argument seriously in the consideration sense of that expression.
My doubts about this reflect my suspicion that the jurisprudential
position of some Strict Constructionists is motivated by their desire to
produce conclusions they favor for extra-legal reasons. Admittedly, to
achieve reflective equilibrium on legal-rights matters one can
legitimately make adjustments in one's position on morally-legitimate
legal argument in one's culture as well as in one's conclusions about
the internally-right answers to various legal-rights questions in one's
culture. However, it appears to me that at least some Strict
Constructionists are not arguing or reasoning in good faith. Thus, in
my judgment, all Strict Constructionists have a view of the
appropriate weight to be given to original intent in constitutional
interpretation that is hard to support in good faith (since it was not
shared by the Founding Fathers and is inconsistent with the relevant
19. See MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 170-83; Legitimate Legal Argument,
supra note 2, at 448-53.
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social interpretive practice); some alter the variant of the approach
that they employ and the breadth of the historical analyses they
undertake to reach conclusions they personally prefer; some clearly
misanalyze the historical data they do consider or ignore information
that establishes the meaning of critical words in constitutional texts at
the time at which the relevant provisions were adopted to enable
themselves to reach personally-preferred legal-rights conclusions; and
some make claims about the self-declaring meaning of constitutional
texts and the content of that meaning (viz., that the Constitution's
text establishes very few rights against the State) that are not just
wrong but hard to endorse unblushingly. 0
Just to provide some evidence to support my claim that my
doubts about whether some Strict Constructionists should be said to
have taken legal argument seriously in the consideration sense of that
expression do not stem in some simple, unacceptable way from my
admitted rejection of many of their "moral-ought views," I should
point out that I also question whether some Legal Realists and some
members of the Critical Legal Studies movement- individuals whose
"ought views" are much closer to my own-are really taking legal
argument seriously in the consideration sense of that expression.
Thus, although some members of these groups base their conclusion
that no internally-right answer can be given to at least many
important legal-rights questions on epistemological views and
empirical conclusions about our moral and legal practices that are
defensibly grounded (both in effort and in substance), others do not.
D. A Comparisonof Balkin and Levinson's and My Usage of "Taking
Legal Reasoning Seriously ": A Review of Their Three Examples
Balkin and Levinson develop and discuss three examples of
disputes about legal reasoning whose participants might accuse each
other of "not taking legal reasoning seriously." In the first, one
participant (A) disagrees with the other's (B's) claim that "there is,
strictly speaking, a distinct set of arguments and forms of reasoning
that are 'legal"' although A agrees with B that "there may be

20. My suspicions about the good faith of some Strict Constructionists and my doubts
about the soundness of many of their premises and the validity of many of their arguments lies
behind my use of strong language to describe the behavior of judges who have abandoned
legitimate legal argument on my understanding for what I describe as arcane analyses that deny
the connection between legitimate legal argument and the commitments of our society. See
MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 8-11.
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arguments that are not legal."'" According to Balkin and Levinson, in
this example, "A takes legal reasoning seriously, but A does not take
the category of 'legal reasoning' seriously. '22 This usage is obviously
different from my own. In my usage, both A and B might or might not
be taking legal reasoning seriously in the consideration sense, the
extent to which B is taking legal reasoning seriously in the conviction
sense will depend on the extent to which the fixed set of arguments B
recognizes as "legal" are capable of producing right answers to all
legal-rights questions, and whether and the extent to which A is
taking legal argument more or less seriously than B in the conviction
sense will depend on whether the unidentified and perhaps
incompletely identifiable set of additional arguments A would classify
as "legal" (would claim can be legitimately used to determine what
the law is) and B would classify as "not legal" increase or decrease
the ability of "legal argument" as A understands that concept to
generate internally-right answers to legal-rights questions.
Balkin and Levinson elaborate on their descriptions of both A's
and B's positions in this example by indicating that, unlike B, A
rejects "a categorical distinction between purely legal and other forms
of reasoning" -"sees
legal reasoning as continuous with, and
'23 I
informed by many other different varieties of, practical reasoning.
hasten to add that, like A, I do not think that legal argument is
autonomous in the sense of never encompassing arguments from
disciplines that have an independent status. Indeed, the mode of
argument that I think dominates legitimate legal argument in our
culture -arguments of moral principle-is a philosophical mode of
argument. I also readily acknowledge that, in a variety of contexts,
economic, historical, psychological, and sociological arguments (to
name but a few) are also inside the law.
In Balkin and Levinson's second example, A acknowledges that
"many different forms of legal reasoning" are used in practice but
claims that one such form or some subset of these forms is or are
superior, thereby designating as "deficient" B's preferred form of
legal reasoning. 24 According to Balkin and Levinson, in this case, B
would say that A was not taking legal reasoning seriously, while A
would say that B's understanding of legal reasoning was not "best"

21.
22.
23.
24.

Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 554.
See id. at 555.
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and might "not even qualify as 'legal reasoning."'5
I have two points to make about Balkin and Levinson's account
of this second case. First, although Balkin and Levinson appear to be
suggesting that A does not think that legal practice is self-legitimating
while B does, they do not indicate the criterion by which either is
evaluating the use of any particular "form of legal reasoning"-i.e.,
they do not specify whether A's and B's preference for one over other
forms of legal reasoning reflects mere whim, its consistency with their
understanding of our culture's moral-rights commitments, its
tendency to promote their personal ultimate values, its aesthetic
attractiveness to them, or its tendency to benefit them in a narrowlydefined, parochial way. Second, once again, the usages that Balkin
and Levinson attribute to A and B are not my own. In this scenario, I
would need to know more about the bases of A's and B's legalreasoning preferences to decide whether they are taking legal
argument seriously in the consideration sense of that expression or
whether they were recommending approaches to answering legalrights questions that do not even "qualify as 'legal reasoning."' I
would also need to know the extent to which their preferred "forms
of legal reasoning" or "modes of legal argument" would yield unique
answers to legal-rights questions to determine whether they were
taking legal argument seriously in the conviction sense of that
expression.
In Balkin and Levinson's third example, A believes that there are
many forms of legitimate legal argument, that "there is no hierarchy
among them," and that different forms of legitimate legal argument
may favor different legal outcomes, while B has a preferred form
(which he presumably believes either is the only legitimate form of
legal argument or is hierarchically superior to the other legitimate
forms). According to Balkin and Levinson, in this case, B would say
that "A is not taking 'legal reasoning' seriously" or that A is not
taking B's preferred form of "legal reasoning as seriously as" A would
like (read: "thinks is appropriate" or "believes one should"). 26 In this

case as well, Balkin and Levinson are putting words into B's mouth
that I would never utter. This third example covers my disagreement
with Philip Bobbitt: he is A and I am B. Not only do I not
characterize Bobbitt's position in the way Balkin and Levinson state
B would characterize A's position, but in this Reply I have explained
25. Id.
26. Id.
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why such a characterization would be unjustified on my
understanding of "taking legal argument seriously."
One final point. After explaining their three examples in the
terms I have described, Balkin and Levinson admit that they have put
words into A's and B's mouths that are misleading: "when people
fight over the meaning of a practice," "there is something quite
misleading about the claim that one side or the other does not take
the practice 'seriously.' 27 Although I agree that this conclusion is
correct if one is using "taking legal reasoning seriously" in the sense
of "recognizing the social importance of the phenomenon or
concept," it may not be correct in the consideration or conviction
senses of that expression. A Liberal Legalist (such as myself) believes
that legitimate legal argument helps us to achieve justice. Many Crits
believe that legitimate legal argument is an opiate of the masses-i.e.,
conceals the unjust realities of our culture and retards its reformation.
Hence, both groups take "legitimate legal argument" seriously in the
"social importance" sense in which Balkin and Levinson are using this
expression in the passage just quoted. However, as I have already
indicated, no member of the Critical Legal Studies movement takes
legal argument seriously in the conviction sense, and at least some
members of this group do not take it seriously in the consideration
sense of that expression.
E. Balkin and Levinson's Complaint That My Usage of "Taking Legal
Reasoning Seriously" Ignores the Fact That an Individual's LegalReasoning Obligations Vary with His Law-Role28

I have two responses to this criticism. First, as Part II of this
Reply makes clear, I do not think that some of the institutional roledifferences or political considerations that Balkin and Levinson claim
affect the relevant law-role players' legal-reasoning obligations in fact
do so. Second, and more importantly, to the extent that they do, that
fact has no bearing on my usages of the expression "taking legal
27. Id. at 557.
28. In Balkin and Levinson's words, I ignore the fact that "institutional differences
between different positions in the legal system matter greatly to how one reasons about and
with the law." Id. at 547. Balkin and Levinson illustrate this point by arguing that the ways in
which lower-court and higher-court judges are obligated to treat precedent differ, see id. at 544,
that "political" considerations within their courts as well as in the society as a whole may affect
the legal-reasoning obligations of judges, see id. at 547, that lawyers are obligated to make
arguments in whose validity or alleged force they do not believe, see id. at 545-48, and that law
teachers are obligated to teach arguments they consider to be illegitimate or invalid, see id. at
549-51.
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argument (legal reasoning) seriously." The fact that different law-role
players are obligated to make or heed different legal arguments is
irrelevant to whether they or anyone else are "taking legal reasoning
seriously" in any sense of that expression I have distinguished.
Admittedly, however, it would be possible to add a sixth,
"obligational" sense of that expression in which someone could be
said to be "taking legal reasoning seriously" if he fulfilled his "legal
reasoning" obligations. Obviously, determinations of whether a given
individual was "taking legal reasoning seriously" in this sixth sense
would have to be sensitive to differences in the legal-reasoning
obligations of different law-role players.

I understand why Balkin and Levinson so dislike the conviction
sense of "taking legal argument seriously" I set forth in the
Introduction to this symposium. They are sympathetic toward or
agree with the Critical Legal Studies view that what counts as
morally-legitimate or valid legal argument in a given culture at a
given time is determined by contemporaneous social negotiation in
that culture. In their words: "The practice of legal reasoning is a
socially constructed enterprise whose boundaries and conventions are
constantly under negotiation by its participants and, therefore, tend
to change over time. ' 29 Since Balkin and Levinson believe that legal
practice is morally self-legitimating3 ° (to the extent that they believe
that anything can be said to be morally legitimate in any objective
sense), they would no doubt also agree with the proposition that
"'morally-legitimate legal argument' is a socially constructed concept
whose boundaries and conventions are constantly under negotiation
by its participants and therefore tend to change over time." Although
I would agree that the kinds of legal argument that are "socially
accepted" as morally legitimate or valid are constantly under
negotiation and change over time, I disagree with the claim that
contemporaneous social acceptance is a sufficient condition for moral
legitimacy or validity: the morally-illegitimate or invalid use of a
particular kind of argument to determine what the law is may be

29. Id. at 552.
30. I should note that at no point in their manuscript do Balkin and Levinson articulate
their premise that legal practice is morally self-legitimating, much less acknowledge its
contestability. This omission is telling in that it suggests that they believe that this proposition is
self-evidently correct.
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socially accepted in a given culture at a given time because at that
time a majority of, a winning political coalition in, or all members of
that culture may incorrectly perceive or choose to ignore their moral
commitments or those commitments' implications for morallylegitimate and valid legal argument. Hence, although I acknowledge
that "socially accepted" legal argument is constantly negotiated and
changes over time, I disagree that the same can be said for "morallylegitimate or valid legal argument. ' 31
Relatedly, Balkin and Levinson write that "debates about who is
and who is not taking legal reasoning seriously must be approached
sociologically as well as philosophically. ' '32 In fact, I think this
understates their actual view: they really believe that debates about
such topics must be approached solely sociologically and historically.
Their equation of morally-legitimate and valid legal argument with
socially-accepted
legal argument underlies not only
our
methodological disagreement but also their (to my mind) mistaken
belief that my conclusions about morally-legitimate and valid legal
argument in our culture are defeated by the following two facts:
(1) "the criteria for 'good' or 'serious' legal reasoning have changed
markedly over time, especially as the participants in the practice
and their social positions have changed" and
(2) "even in our own age ... people with different ... perspectives"
have different views about what "forms of 'legal reasoning' are
useful, socially acceptable, morally legitimate, or valid (the
3
adjectives are mine).3
In my judgment, the fact that the legal community's perception of
legitimate or valid legal argument changes over time, the fact that the
individuals who people our society at any given time may disagree
about the legal arguments whose use is morally legitimate or valid in
our culture, as well as the fact that these individuals try to persuade
each other that their conception of legitimate legal argument is
correct or to induce each other to accept the use of particular
conceptions of legitimate legal argument are irrelevant to whether, at
31. I should add that, although my position on morally-legitimate legal argument is a
"conventionalist" position, I would not agree that this concept is a "social construct" in the
sense in which Balkin and Levinson claim it is "socially constructed." For an analysis of the
various ways in which the label "conventionalist" may be misleading, see Postscript C to
Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 2, at 489-91.
32. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 551.
33. See id. at 553. For a brilliant analysis of the intellectual dynamics behind our culture's
shifting from emphasizing one mode of legal argument to emphasizing another such mode, see
PHILIP BOBBIT1, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
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any given time, there is a unique, morally-legitimate or valid way to
discover what the law is, or whether, in our culture, the morallylegitimate or valid approach to this task has not changed over time.
Of course, I was aware of Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson's
jurisprudential views when I invited them to participate in this
symposium. Indeed, I asked them to contribute an article precisely
because their views are so opposed to mine. I am therefore not the
least bit surprised that they think that my conviction usage of "taking
legal argument seriously" is "misleading" 34 in that it fails to
acknowledge that people who subscribe to their views may take legal
reasoning or argument very seriously in various other senses of this
expression-viz., not only in the "legal craftsmanship" senses to
which the draft-Introduction they saw did refer but in the
"consideration" and "social importance" senses, 35 which that draft did
not mention. Perhaps this Reply has assuaged them by recognizing
the appropriateness of these latter two senses of the expression
"taking legal reasoning (argument) seriously." However, contrary to
Balkin and Levinson, I do think that people who subscribe to their
views do "lack[] loyalty to the practice" in one sense-the conviction
sense-of the expression and that at least some of those who
subscribe to their views "make[] fun of the practice, or view[] the
practice skeptically or condescendingly. '36 Balkin and Levinson may
be justified in demanding that these accusations be clarified (the
quoted material is their language, not mine) and may be willing to
demur to them as clarified, but they cannot realistically deny them
once they have been clarified.
II. BALKIN AND LEVINSON's EMPIRICAL REFUTATION OF MY
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT IN OUR
CULTURE

Balkin and Levinson argue that my conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture are refuted3 7 by their
34. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 557.
35. See id.
36. Id. I hasten to add that some observers who believe that the use of each imaginable
kind of argument that could be used to determine what the law is is either morally legitimate or
morally illegitimate and that there are internally-right answers to all legal-rights questions also
have not taken legal argument as seriously as they should have done in the consideration sense
of that expression.
37. Balkin and Levinson point out one additional fact not related to fit that others or they
may believe also undercuts my conclusion that there is a unique, morally-legitimate way to
ascertain what the law is in our culture-viz., the fact that even those experts who believe in the
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inconsistency with our society's or various well-informed individuals'
beliefs about the obligations of high-court judges, lower-court judges,
drafters and enactors of new legislation or regulations, lawyers, and
law teachers as well as by the failure of these actors to fulfill the

obligations Balkin and Levinson claim my position on morallylegitimate legal argument implies they have. 38 Part II argues that, for a
variety of reasons, my conclusions fit the relevant beliefs and
behaviors far better than Balkin and Levinson suppose and that the

non-fits that are present are far less damaging to my position than
Balkin and Levinson would in any event claim. To ease the

exposition, Part II assumes that in our culture morally-legitimate legal
argument coincides with valid legal argument-i.e., that no clear
existence of a unique morally-legitimate approach to determining what the law is disagree
significantly about its content. It seems clear to me that the existence of such disagreement is
not dispositive. Nor, I admit, is the fact (recognized by Balkin and Levinson) that each of the
participants in this debate believes that he has uncovered the correct, morally-legitimate
approach. See id. at 544.
38. A number of the other contributors to this symposium have pointed out two additional
facts that some (not necessarily they) may believe count against or refute my conclusions about
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture. First, both Jack Getman and Dennis Patterson
emphasize the important role that different kinds of factual analysis play in (morally-legitimate)
legal argument. See Julius Getman, A Labor Lawyer's View of Legal Argument, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 409 (1999); Dennis Patterson, Taking Commercial Law Seriously: From Jurisprudence
to Pedagogy, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (1999). Of course, my view of legitimate legal argument
in our culture is perfectly compatible with various kinds of factual analyses' playing a critical
role in the determination of what the law is.
Second, both Lawrence Friedman and Michael Sean Quinn call attention to the reality and
importance of legal change. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 536; Michael Sean Quinn,
Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism
of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 740 (1999). However, the fact that our law has
changed-indeed, the fact that it has changed substantially or enormously-is not incompatible
with my conclusions about the morally-legitimate way to determine what the law is in our
culture. Much of the change in our law has resulted from new legislation or administrative
regulations: my account of the morally-legitimate way to determine what the law is has little
relevance to such changes in the law. Admittedly, however, a considerable amount of legal
change has resulted from judges' revising their conclusions about common-law rights,
constitutional rights, the correct interpretation of extant statutes or regulations, or the deference
they should give to administrative interpreters. It is therefore important to emphasize that such
changes in judicially-announced law may also be compatible with my position on morallylegitimate legal argument: some such changes may reflect changes in social realities that alter
the internally-right answer to a formally-unchanged legal-rights question; some may reflect
changes in statutory law that alter the consequences of particular common-law doctrines and
arguably the internally-right answer to the legal-rights question to which those doctrines relate
(for example, the passage of antidiscrimination statutes and whistleblower-protection statutes
may alter the consequences and hence internal correctness of the employment-at-will doctrine);
and some may reflect changes in the judges' understanding of the rights-related concepts that
are relevant to the legal-rights question under consideration, changes in their appreciation of
the relevant facts, or changes in their conception of morally-legitimate legal argument in our
culture (judges' making new mistakes or correcting old ones). My conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture do not imply that the law will not in practice change for
these reasons. (Nor do my conclusions deny that judges' perceptions of the facts and moral
norms that are relevant to determining what the law is are historically embedded.)
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constitutional context that, in the relevant sense, was properly
understood by its ratifiers renders valid an argument whose use is
morally illegitimate or renders internally correct an answer to a legalrights question that is inconsistent with our society's moral
commitments.
A. The Implicationsof My ConclusionsAbout Legitimate Legal
Argument for the Law-Role Obligationsof Various Law-Role Players:
My Understandingand Balkin and Levinson's Claims
1. High-Court Judges and Lower-Court Judges
According to my accounts of the moral commitments of our
society and their implications for morally-legitimate legal practice in
our culture, individual judges are obligated to adopt the morallylegitimate approach to analyzing legal-rights issues and to reach those
legal-rights conclusions that that approach implies are internally
correct. Moreover, judges who write individual opinions in cases are
obligated to report the morally-legitimate (valid) reasoning that
renders internally correct the legal conclusions they deemed essential
to the resolution of the case in hand (and any other legal conclusions
they offered in the way of dicta). To fulfill these obligations perfectly,
a judge would have to have a correct, considered opinion about
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture and to apply this
approach carefully and correctly to the cases he or she was required
to decide. Such a judge's votes would be determined by his morallylegitimate (valid) legal analysis, and his opinions would articulate his
legal reasoning.
Obviously, when combined with my conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture, this abstract position has
implications for the internally-correct way to resolve many concrete
methodological (as well as specific legal-rights) issues. I will analyze
the implications of my general position for the appropriate resolution
of the three methodological issues on which Balkin and Levinson
specifically comment.39

39. Of course, I realize that some judges (like some lawyers, law professors, and law
students) are much better at "intuiting" the internally-right answer to legal-rights questions than
at explaining the basis of these "intuitions." I also realize that being better at explaining the
basis of one's legal-rights conclusions does not guarantee being better at discovering the
internally-right answer to legal-rights questions (though I believe that sophistication about the
concept of legitimate legal argument will help one discover the internally-right answers to legalrights questions).
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a. Precedent
I believe that high-court judges are not morally or legally
obligated to follow precedent slavishly. Admittedly, if my conclusions
about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture are correct,
high-court judges will sometimes be obligated to give mistaken
precedents some weight (since not doing so will frustrate the
reasonable expectations of-fail to show appropriate respect formoral-rights holders who are entitled to reasonably rely on the prior
decisions in question). More specifically, I think that the reliancerelated weight that an incorrect precedent should be given will vary
with such factors as the status of the court that and judge(s) who
made the original mistake, the extent to which the relevant issue was
carefully briefed or argued to the court, and the extent to which the
court discussed the issue in its opinion, etc. However, high-court
judges will not be obligated to give weight to (indeed, will be
obligated not to give weight to) a precedent when it was so obviously
incorrect at the time at which it was decided that reliance on it would
not be reasonable, when information about its consequences or
factual predicates that became available after it was set makes it
sufficiently clear that it was wrongly decided to render reliance on it
unreasonable, when the party with the alleged reliance interest
culpably caused the original judicial error, or when the party with the
alleged reliance interest is not a moral-rights holder (e.g., is the
government in circumstances in which it is not standing in the shoes
of one or more individual moral-rights holders).40
As Balkin and Levinson indicate,41 I have not previously written
about the possibility that it might be morally legitimate in our culture
to require lower-court judges to follow precedent to a greater extent
than high-court judges are obligated to do. I can think of two moralrights-related rationales for such an arrangement.
First, one might argue that lower-court judges are sufficiently
likely to be wrong when they want to depart from precedent that the
rights of the parties involved in the disputes directly involved would
be better protected by a rule that allowed only high-court judges to
40. This list assumes that various utilitarian considerations that may favor a strict rule of
following precedent (e.g., the mechanical-transaction-cost and certainty advantages of
preventing relitigation) cannot in fact justicize it. For a discussion of the argument that
transaction-cost savings can justicize failing to enforce moral rights, see MATTERS OF
PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 20-21. For a discussion of the morally-legitimate approach to take
to precedent, see id. at 60, 72-74.
41. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 546-47.
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overrule precedent. However, this argument is empirically dubious
and is weakened further by the private cost of appealing all the way
to the high court as well as by the possibility that a lower court may
be able to secure more careful review of a wrong precedent by
refusing to follow it than by expressing doubts about it and
encouraging litigants to challenge it on high.
Second, one might argue that lower courts should not be
authorized to overrule precedent because not following precedent
disserves moral-rights-related interests by undermining faith in the
rule of law. A similar lack of confidence in "the People" deterred any
judge from publishing a dissent for over twenty years in post-World
War II West Germany. I do not find this argument persuasive. In my
judgment, our system is premised on the People's ability to exercise
moral and political responsibility, our People's commitment to the
rule of law is less fragile than this argument's proponents seem to
believe, and in any event both the principled and the more efficacious
way to instill respect for the rule of law is to provide an accurate
account of what "analyzing what the law is" entails, despite the fact
that (or perhaps precisely because) that account will reveal that many
legal-rights issues can be properly resolved only through a nonmechanical approach that cannot be uncontestably operationalized in a
way that will prevent its good-faith execution by different, assiduous
experts from yielding different legal conclusions.
As the preceding paragraph implies, I am somewhat skeptical of
the possibility of justicizing a requirement that lower-court judges be
absolutely bound by higher-court precedents. However, I would not
rule out the possibility that such an arrangement might be morally
legitimate-i.e., consistent with our society's moral commitments.
Admittedly, these initial efforts to redeem my failure to
"consider[] the institutional situation of inferior courts '42 have not
enabled me to generate a clear-cut conclusion about whether it is
morally legitimate in our culture to bind "inferior" judges to follow
the precedents of their superiors in the way that Balkin and Levinson
assume our current practice requires them to do. 3 However, I can
answer one of the questions to which Balkin and Levinson invite me
to respond in relation to this issue: if it is morally legitimate for
"inferior" judges to be required to follow precedent and our empirical
practice is to bind them in this way, then an "inferior" judge who
42. Id. at 547.
43. See id.
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followed precedent would have fulfilled his professional obligations

even if his reasoning were different from the reasoning on which a
high-court judge would be obligated to base both his legal conclusions
and his opinion.4 Indeed, such an "inferior" judge would be fulfilling
his obligations by taking "legal argument seriously" even if he ended

up reaching a legal-rights conclusion that the high-court judge who
reviewed his decision was obligated to overrule.
Balkin and Levinson also seem to believe that my position on
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture implies that judges in

"courts like the Supreme Court of the United States" are relatively
free to follow or reject their own precedents-in Balkin and
Levinson's words, "may follow their own previous precedents but are
by no means required to.145 In fact, as I have just indicated, I think
that high-court judges are always obligated either to follow or to
overrule each of the specific precedents that relates to the cases they
must decide.
b. PrudentialArgument
By "prudential argument," I mean argument that relates
consequences of a choice that are not valued because they
directly4 6 to the moral rights of those the choice affects. In
practice, an individual judge's decision on whether to reach the

to the
relate
actual
merits

of a case, how to vote on a particular issue, whether to join a majority
opinion, concur, or dissent, and what rationale to provide for his vote

are

sometimes

influenced by a

wide variety of prudential

considerations. Admittedly, prudential analyses are relevant to the

proper interpretation of statutes or constitutional provisions that
were designed to instantiate a particular personal ultimate value, to
achieve a personal-ultimate-value-related goal, or to benefit their
44. Balkin and Levinson actually ask whether in such a case the "inferior" judges would be
"taking legal reasoning seriously" if they followed precedents slavishly. See id. I would also
answer "yes" to this somewhat different question. See supra Part I.E for a related, general
discussion of the "obligational" sense of "taking legal argument seriously" -i.e., of the meaning
of taking legal-argument obligations seriously.
45. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 547.
46. Of course, inasmuch as moral-rights holders have a moral right that the State secure
those of their legal rights that do not derive from their independent moral rights (e.g., legal
rights that are created by statutes or constitutional provisions that are designed to further
personal ultimate values, personal-ultimate-value-related goals, or the parochial interests of
their supporters), moral-rights holders will have a moral right that the statute or constitutional
provision be interpreted to maximize the extent to which it promotes the personal ultimate
values, goals, or private benefits it was designed to secure (i.e., will have a moral right that the
relevant legal interpretation reflect the relevant consequences). To this extent, it is morally
legitimate to use prudential argument to determine what the law is in our culture.
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supporters for nondefensible reasons. Prudential analysis also has a
legitimate role to play in constitutional analysis in general since the
fact that a government choice does not further any goal the State can
legitimately pursue calls its constitutionality into question. Thus, most
choices of this sort are unconstitutional because they were made to
achieve results the State may not seek to achieve. And some such
choices are unconstitutional because they violate their victims' right
to appropriate concern by harming them for no reason at all. I should
add that the fact that a choice "generates a legitimate benefit" is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its constitutionality.
Thus, the fact that a State choice produces no legitimate benefit does
not guarantee its unconstitutionality since harmful, pointless State
choices may be constitutional if they were produced by a decisionprocedure that allocated an appropriate amount of resources to
filtering out such lemons. And the fact that a State choice produces
some legitimate benefits does not establish its constitutionality since
State choices that further legitimate goals will be unconstitutional, for
example, if the decision to make them was critically affected by some
of their supporters' impermissible motivations.
In any event, my conclusions about our society's moral
commitments do imply that it is morally illegitimate for judges to be
influenced by many other types of prudential considerations-viz., by
the effect of their decision on the political viability of the courts, by
the likely willingness of lower courts and police to enforce the legal
rights the judge would otherwise conclude the relevant moral-rights
holders have, by the likely willingness of the population at large to
behave consistently with what the court would otherwise conclude
was the internally-right answer to the relevant legal-rights question,
or by the possibility that the announcement of that otherwiseinternally-right answer would lead to more general lawlessness. On
my understanding, judges are obligated to ignore such prudential
considerations when deciding how their court should resolve legalrights issues and when deciding whether to vote with the majority or
to dissent. My conclusions about morally-legitimate legal argument
also imply that any opinion a judge writes should indicate the
morally-legitimate legal argument that provides the internal
justification for his legal-rights conclusion even if doing so will incite
disobedience to his ruling or more general lawlessness. In fact,
although I am not sure about this, I am inclined to conclude that it is
improper for judges to try to make their conclusions more palatable
to the public by explaining why they are more attractive than some
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might suppose in various legally-irrelevant personal-ultimate-value

terms (though it clearly would be appropriate for a judge to explain
why people who have various conceptions of morally-legitimate legal

argument that differ from his would reach the same conclusion that
he reached). All this reflects my conclusion that judges are obligated
to be 100% principled 100% of the time when they are deciding legal47
rights questions.
Balkin and Levinson attack my evaluation of the moral
legitimacy of prudential legal argument inter alia by rejecting its

implications for the evaluation of the performance of various
Supreme Court Justices in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown
1"). 8 Thus, Balkin and Levinson ask (rhetorically): "Should Justice
Reed be condemned because he did not 'take legal reasoning

seriously"' when, against conviction, he joined the majority in Brown
I-i.e., when he "agree[d] not to publicly reveal that he disagreed
with the opinion because he felt that segregated schools were
constitutional? ' 49 1 would say that Justice Reed should be condemned

on this account: his conduct violated his professional obligation in
that he did not vote in the way that his (incorrect) view of morallylegitimate or valid legal reasoning implied was internally correct.
From the perspective of Justice Reed's obligations, his two wrongs
did not make a right even though they did result in his voting for the

internally-correct resolution of the case.
47. This conclusion may seem to be inconsistent with my acceptance of the moral
legitimacy in our culture of the constitutional provision authorizing the President to declare
martial law in emergency situations and thereby to abrogate what in normal times would be
various moral and constitutional rights of individuals for whom our State is responsible. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 18-19, I
argue that, if appropriate procedural and institutional safeguards are instituted to prevent its
misuse or abuse, this authorization will be rendered morally legitimate by its use's ability to
protect rights-related interests on balance by preventing otherwise-unpreventable horizontalrights violations by private actors or by reducing the risk that our State will be supplanted by a
non-rights-based State or (perhaps) a State committed to the protection of a different set of
rights. It seems to me that three facts render this position consistent with my conclusion that it is
internally incorrect for judges to make their legal-rights conclusions or judicial opinions depend
on similar prudential considerations: (1) the Constitution contains no text authorizing judges to
take such considerations into account; (2) since in the relevant sense judges have the final word
on what the law means and since the relevant prudential considerations will normally involve
acceding to the unprincipled desires of a politically-influential group, it may be more difficult to
provide procedural and institutional protections against judicial abuses or misuses of such an
authorization than to provide such safeguards against Presidential abuses of this power in times
of real emergency; and (3) there is less reason to trust the accuracy of judges' "political
judgments" or predictions about the way in which people will react to particular legal rulings or
rationales than to trust the accuracy of the conclusions of a politician such as the President on
such issues.
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). I refer to this case as Brown I.
49. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 548.
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Balkin and Levinson also seem to praise the Court's opinion in
Brown Is°-i.e., to approve of Chief Justice Warren's decision not to
write an opinion that reflected his and several other Justices'
"considered views or even their preferred methods of constitutional
argument"'" to secure the unanimity that he thought was needed to
"send a clear message to the South" 52 and to enable himself to write
an opinion "that would be 'readable by the lay public."' 53 More
specifically, to secure Justice Reed's vote and appease the South,
Warren wrote an opinion in Brown I that did not condemn the
segregationists and, relatedly, omitted any discussion of the
constitutional-law relevance of the fact that segregation violated the
moral rights of many members of our society by insulting them. In my
judgment, the Chief Justice's choice-though, no doubt wellmotivated-violated his judicial obligations. It also did not further the
entirely laudable prudential aims that motivated the Chief Justice and
laid the groundwork for a number of other important errors that his
Court and its successors subsequently made (though I realize that
statements like these that attribute causal power to doctrinal
conclusions cause the eyes of many law-and-society people to roll in
their heads).
Let me be more specific. 54 Warren's prudentialist Brown I
opinion did not appease the South. It also did not convince
Southerners of the soundness of the Court's constitutional conclusion.
Perhaps no opinion could have done so, but Warren's decision to
omit the internally-right reason for concluding that school segregation
was unconstitutional (viz., that it violated moral rights by insulting the
targets of the moral discrimination it entailed) certainly did not
increase his opinion's persuasiveness. Southern editorial writers and
opinion-makers had a field-day criticizing the poor argumentation
and dubious factual bases of the opinion. Warren's opinion failed to
provide its readers with the information that would have indicated
whether State segregation of facilities other than public schools was
50. In his contribution to this symposium, Lawrence Friedman in essence supports Balkin
and Levinson's approval of the Court's performance in Brown I.See Friedman, supra note 15, at
531-32.
51. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 548.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 58 (1992), itself
quoting a memorandum from Chief Justice Warren to his fellow Justices to this effect).
54. For a fuller account of all the points made in the next two paragraphs of the text, see
MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 234-48; for a discussion of the courts' use of
misleading stipulative definitions of various key concepts in the cases in question, see id. at 26670.
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unconstitutional. And, most important, Brown I and its progeny did
not induce the South to desegregate its public schools: ten years after
Brown I, only one percent of those children in the deep South
classified as being of African descent who attended a public school
were enrolled in a school that contained even one Caucasian child. 5
In my judgment, Brown I also contributed to the courts' making
a large number of other substantive-law and remedial errors. In
particular, Brown I's failure to focus on the moral wrong of
segregation and its concomitant failure to identify the full set of
moral-rights holders who were victims of that wrong (a set that
includes not just the segregated school children but all those who had
the attribute that led to these children's segregation) led subsequent
courts to misidentify what counts as segregation (both when deciding
whether segregation had taken place and when deciding whether the
impact of school segregation on school-attendance patterns had been
removed) as well as when identifying the harms that school
segregation generated and hence the steps that a previouslysegregating authority might legitimately be required to take to
remedy its wrongs (e.g., when deciding whether it would be
appropriate for courts to require such authorities to take steps to
overcome the prejudice segregation caused (as well as manifested) or
to increase the self-respect of those who were denigrated by the
segregation). Less directly, I also think that Brown I's failure to focus
on the relevant moral-rights issue also contributed to the Court's
failure to assess correctly the constitutionality of various affirmative
action programs (caused the Court to analyze the relevant issues in a
wooden, arcane way that does not consider whether the programs
under review were insulting to either those they immediately harmed
6
or those they immediately benefited).5
I think that as a matter of principle the Court's opinion in Brown
I was wrong. But I would also say that a careful analysis of the
consequences of the Justices' choices in Brown should give
considerable pause to those who "in 'principle'
are willing to
7
approve of judges' being influenced by prudential considerations.
55. The approach that the authorities took to classifying children racially reveals a great
deal about the nature of segregation.
56. For a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of various affirmative action programs,
see MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 249-62. For a discussion of the courts'
misdefinition of "discrimination" in the relevant context, see id. at 266-68.
57. In his contribution to this symposium, Lawrence Friedman, supra note 15, also
expresses his disagreement with those who disapprove of the Brown decision and opinion. Of
course, the relevant question from his perspective is: "compared to what?" Brown v. Board of
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2. Impeachment Triers, Drafters and Enactors of Legislation and
Law-Creating Administrative Regulations, and Authors of Op-Ed
Pieces and Editorial Letters
Balkin and Levinson claim that "the definition of appropriate
legal reasoning may shift" when the actor is not a judge and the task
is not identifying extant legal rights but the actor is a legislator
engaging in "legislative debate (as in the recent Clinton
impeachment)," when the actor is unspecified (presumably a
legislative assistant, administrative-agency employee, or anyone else)
and the task is "the drafting of rules and regulations," or the actor is
anyone and the task is "the composition of op-ed pieces or letters to
the editor. 5 8 They seem to be suggesting not only that my
contribution to this symposium and my book ignore these possibilities
but that my "vision of legal reasoning" is the same not only "for the
legal academic and the 'judge'-i.e., a Justice of the Supreme
Court" 9 -but also for the actors listed in the heading of this
subsection. Although I acknowledge that I have never addressed the
obligations of these latter actors explicitly, what I have written on
other issues should have made clear that I would not be insensitive to
such variations in law-related roles (though, as we shall see, I would
not agree that the "appropriate definition of legal reasoning" for all
such law-role players would be different from my conclusions about
the modes and structure of reasoning that judges are morally
obligated to use to discover what the law is in our culture).
Let me be specific. I begin with debates about impeachment-a
type of debate in which our Constitution obligates the Congress to
engage though it is not in essence "legislative." In my judgment, there
is an internally-right answer to the question: What counts as
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" 60 in the
context of impeachment? For this reason, I would say that the
morally-legitimate way for legislators to debate this issue is no
different from the approach that would be morally legitimate for
Education was clearly better in all senses than a decision to confirm the constitutionality of
school segregation and may have been the best decision one could have hoped for at the time.
But both the "all deliberate speed" remedial conclusion of Brown H, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955),
and the Brown I opinion were far less than ideal (from either my internally-right-answer,
morally-legitimate-legal-argument perspective or from any defensible personal-ultimate-value
perspective). I may be seeing the pitcher as half-empty, while Friedman is responding to the fact
that it is half-full.
58. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 547-48.
59. Id. at 547.
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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judges to use to resolve this issue if that task were assigned to them.
Thus, I agree wholeheartedly with those legislators who claimed that
their vote on the Clinton impeachment was not supposed to be
influenced by what the People wanted even though I disagree with
the conclusions that many of them reached about the meaning of
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" in this context, the facts of the case,
and whether the submitted evidence met the appropriate standard for
conviction.
Next, what does my position imply for the kind of reasoning that
should be employed by those who are creating new legislation or
"legislative" regulations? Obviously, I do not believe that the type of
"legal reasoning" that judges are obligated to employ when deciding
"what the law is" is the same as the kind of "reasoning" that it is
appropriate to use when drafting most "rules and regulations" since
virtually all legitimate new rules and regulations are passed to
instantiate some personal ultimate values or personal-ultimate-valuerelated goals rather than to fulfill the "legislator's" obligation to
secure relevant moral rights.
Finally, what does my understanding of our society's moral
commitments imply about the kind of reasoning that "should be"
employed by authors of op-ed pieces or letters to the editor? I should
point out at the outset that I have used the hedge-word "should"
because I am uncertain about the obligations that membership in a
rights-based polity imposes on such participants in public debates. I
am therefore uncertain about whether some of my conclusions reflect
my personal ultimate values (are "ought" views as opposed to
obligation conclusions). I will proceed, nevertheless, because some of
the points that need to be made are not affected by this distinction
and because some of my conclusions bear a striking resemblance to
the conclusions our society seems to have reached about some of the
obligations that lawyers have to their clients (to the norms associated
with the ethics of constrained zealous advocacy).
As a general matter, I would say that the kind of reasoning that
authors of op-ed pieces or letters to the editor should use depends
primarily on the issues they are addressing and secondarily on the
other roles that they occupy. If the relevant op-ed piece or letter to
the editor is urging the courts to interpret the law in a particular way
(or an administrative agency to make an internally-correct
interpretation of its mandate or of a particular regulation it has
issued), the writer should base his conclusions on the same kinds of
argument that judges are bound to use, with one clarification and one
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exception. The clarification is that, if lower-court judges are more
strongly bound by precedent than are high-court judges, an op-edpiece or editorial-letter writer should point out the difference and
make his recommendations reflect it. The exception is that it may not
be appropriate for op-ed and editorial-letter writers to show any or
the same degree of deference to non-judicial actors' conclusions
about the meaning of some constitutional or statutory text as judges
61
may be bound to do.
By way of contrast, if the relevant op-ed piece or editorial letter
is advocating the passage of some new legislation or "law-creating"
administrative regulation that is not required by our moral-rights
commitments, its writer clearly should not argue for it in the way that
judges should argue about the internally-right answer to a question
about preexisting legal rights.
Three additional issues about the moral position of op-ed-piece
and editorial-letter writers need to be addressed. First, is it morally
legitimate for such a writer to try to persuade his readers to support
some conclusion about existing legal rights by making what I have
been calling a legal argument that he does not believe to be correct or
as forceful as he is alleging, by pointing out certain personal-ultimatevalue-related advantages of his preferred conclusion that he knows
are irrelevant to its internal correctness, by misrepresenting the facts
that are relevant to the internally-correct resolution of the issue in
question, or by appealing to his audience's prejudices? We are
entering deep waters. My suspicion is that the answers to these
questions turn in part on the obligations that one has as a member of
a liberal, rights-based polity and in part on personal judgments about
what individuals who take positions on public issues in such a society
ought to do. My inclination is to conclude that it is legitimate and
acceptable for a writer to provide readers with all arguments for his
legal-rights conclusion that are plausibly morally legitimate, including
arguments that the writer does not himself believe are correct.
Indeed, I might even say that the respect we owe others implies not
61. Admittedly, this exception may not be appropriate if the reason that it is morally
legitimate for judges to show such deference is their inability to prevent or remedy all moralrights violations and concomitant need to provide government officials in general with
encouragement and inducements both to avoid violating moral rights themselves and to prevent
others from doing so. For an operational definition of the amount of deference that judges may
be obligated to show other governmental officials, an explanation of why judges in a liberal,
rights-based State may be morally obligated to show such governmental officials deference, and
an analysis of the factors that should influence the amount of deference judges may be obligated
to give such officials, see MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 210, 214-15, and 216-18
respectively.

1999]

"YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS!"

just the permissibility but the positive appropriateness of doing so.
However, I think that it would be inappropriate for such a writer to
make allegedly "legal arguments" that he was certain were in fact
incorrect or morally illegitimate, to represent as legally relevant
extra-legal arguments he knew to be legally irrelevant, to
misrepresent various facts (regardless of their actual relevance), or to
appeal to his audience's prejudices. I would also say that, although
such a writer should point out the legal irrelevance of various legallyirrelevant personal-ultimate-value consequences of the choice under
consideration, it would be perfectly appropriate for him to point out
those consequences, regardless of whether he subscribed to the
personal ultimate values in question: in essence, this conclusion rests
on the contestable assumption that it is not improper for someone to
try to induce those of his readers who are more interested in the
instantiation of legally-irrelevant personal ultimate values than in the
protection of the relevant legal rights to pay attention to his legalrights argument and to provide public support for it or the conclusion
for which he is arguing. Once more, however, I would say that such a
writer ought not make arguments he knew were false, ought not
assert the legal relevance of arguments he knows to be legally
irrelevant, ought not misrepresent various facts or the quality of
various relevant pieces of empirical research, and ought not appeal to
prejudices, though I am not sure whether he would be violating any
obligations by doing so.
Second, should the writer of an op-ed piece or editorial letter
about an action he wants taken for reasons that are unrelated to
anyone's extant legal right argue that the relevant decision is required
by current law when he knows that it is not or believes on balance
that it is not though an argument that is not clearly wrong could be
made to the contrary? In this case as well, I would say that it was not
only permissible but positively appropriate for such a writer to make
all legal-rights arguments that he believes might be correct but not
those he is certain are wrong. Obviously, no valid objection could be
made to such an author's demonstrating the desirability of the choice
he is advocating from value-perspectives he does not personally
endorse. However, the author of such an op-ed piece or letter to the
editor should not misrepresent the facts or the quality of empirical
studies of the relevant facts and should not appeal to his readers'
prejudices.
The third and last issue that needs to be addressed in this context
is the special obligations that law teachers and perhaps lawyers may
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have when writing op-ed pieces or editorial letters that relate to
topics on which they are generally perceived to have expertise. Even
if membership in a liberal, rights-based polity creates no obligations
in this context, law professors and lawyers may be operating under
special obligation-constraints in such situations. Readers may have
reasonable expectations that what law professors write about extant
legal rights or about the most desirable way for the State to respond
to certain problems or issues reflects their technical or "scientific"
expertise rather than their personal value preferences or parochial
interests. And the same may be true for practicing lawyers, at least
when they have not indicated that they are writing as counsels for
interested clients or that they have a parochial personal interest of
their own in the matter in question. At a minimum, therefore, law
professors and lawyers are more likely to be obligated than other
members of our culture to indicate any parochial interest they have in
any matter on which they write an op-ed piece or editorial letter to
which their professional expertise relates and to indicate the fact that
and the extent to which their preference for the conclusion for which
they are arguing does not reflect their professional expertise. I also
think that law professors and lawyers have special obligations
(1) to reveal their actual evaluations of any legal arguments they
delineate in such writings (inter alia, to articulate and honestly
evaluate the arguments that can be made against the conclusion
for which they are arguing);
(2) either to avoid making personal-ultimate-value-related arguments that are irrelevant to any extant-legal-rights question on
which they are writing or to indicate that such arguments are in
fact irrelevant to the proper resolution of the issue at hand
(though, for the reasons indicated above, this claim does not
imply that such an author should not point out the personalultimate-value-related desirability of the decision he is
advocating);
(3) not to conceal the weaknesses of any empirical analyses on
whose findings they wish to rely, not to exaggerate the
weaknesses of any empirical analyses whose findings cut against
their conclusions, and not to exaggerate their confidence in the
empirical assumptions on which they rely (inter alia, not to
consciously misrepresent the facts); and
(4) not to appeal to the prejudices of their audience.
Obviously, I recognize that the space-limitations under which op-ed-
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piece and editorial-letter writers operate will have to be considered
when deciding whether a law professor or lawyer (or, for that matter,
anyone else) has fulfilled his relevant obligations, but the existence of
these constraints does not simply eliminate obligations that such
writers would otherwise have: if such a writer does not have space to
express his doubts about the legitimacy of a legal argument that he is
not convinced is wrong or to explain or at least to refer to the
weaknesses of an empirical study on whose findings he would like to
rely, he may be obligated not to make use of the argument or study at
all. But my basic point is that law professors and lawyers are probably
more constrained by obligations when they write op-ed pieces or
editorial letters on topics to which their expertise relates than are
those on whose expertise the public does not expect to be able to rely.
3. Lawyers When Arguing in Court for Their Clients' Rights
Balkin and Levinson's section on "Do Practicing Lawyers 'Take
Legal Reasoning Seriously'?" makes one and possibly two criticisms
of my argument. The definite criticism is one of clarity: "Markovits's
argument vacillates over whether 'taking legal reasoning seriously' is
a matter of internal states of mind or external performance. '62 The
criticism they may be making is one of substance: they may be
claiming that the fact that our society imposes a duty of zealous
advocacy on its lawyers undermines my conclusions about morallylegitimate legal argument in our culture. I will now address each of
these criticisms in turn.
In Balkin and Levinson's usage, the "external performance"
dimension of a lawyer's relevant conduct refers to the lawyer's efforts
to make it appear that he is making morally-legitimate (valid) legal
arguments and that he honestly believes that the answer to the
relevant legal-rights question that favors his client is the internallycorrect answer to that question. 63 By way of contrast, Balkin and
Levinson's "internal" sense of taking legal reasoning seriously refers
to the actual beliefs of the relevant lawyer-whether he honestly
believes that his argument is morally legitimate and the conclusion for
which he is arguing is internally correct. To Balkin and Levinson, this
distinction is important because, in our culture, a lawyer is not
required to take legal reasoning seriously in their internal sense.
Indeed, according to Balkin and Levinson:
62. Balkin & Levinson, supranote 1, at 545.
63. See id. at 545-46.
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Lawyers not only are required to make arguments they do not
personally believe, but also are required to make them in a
rhetorical form that appears to take law very seriously indeed and
that insists that the positions they espouse are the objectively correct
answers.64

Now, what of Balkin and Levinson's claim that I "vacillate[] over
whether 'taking legal reasoning seriously' is a matter of internal states
of mind or external performance"? My previous writings certainly did
not "vacillate" about this issue because they never addressed it.
However, I will address it here. I will not vacillate, but I will say that
whether a lawyer who is "simulating" rather than stating what he
actually believes should be said to be "taking legal reasoning or
argument seriously" depends on the sense in which the latter
expression is being used. In my usage, a lawyer who believes that his
advocacy will be more effective if he makes socially-accepted legal
arguments will be taking legal argument seriously in the
craftsmanship sense regardless of whether he believes that his
arguments are correct. Similarly, the fact that such a lawyer is
simulating his belief in arguments with which he disagrees is also
irrelevant to whether he takes legal argument seriously in either my
conviction sense or my consideration sense. To see why, note that
whether or not a lawyer is simulating his belief in his argument for
pragmatic reasons says absolutely nothing about whether he believes
or takes seriously the possibility that all (most, some) possible
arguments that might be made to determine what the law is are either
morally legitimate or morally illegitimate (valid or invalid) or believes
or takes seriously the possibility that all (most, some) possible
answers that might be given to any legal-rights question are either
internally-correct or internally-incorrect. When the lawyer is
simulating his belief in an argument for pragmatic reasons, he is doing
something that is unconnected with "taking legal argument seriously"
in the "conviction" and "consideration" senses I distinguish. To be
honest, I find the linguistic issue on which I am accused of vacillating
uninteresting.
The important issue is whether my position on morally-legitimate
legal argument in our culture has implications for the propriety of
lawyers' simulating their belief in arguments in which they do not
believe. Perhaps Balkin and Levinson conflate this "obligation" issue
with the language issue just analyzed because they generally conflate
my position on morally-legitimate argument in our culture (and its
64. Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
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obligation-implications) with the issue of my understanding of "taking
legal argument seriously." Previously, I said that Mr. Justice Reed's
decision to join the majority in Brown I in the face of his conviction
that public school segregation was not unconstitutional violated his
obligations as a judge. On my understanding, judges are obligated to
vote the way that their conception of morally-legitimate (valid) legal
argument implies is internally correct and to articulate the valid legal
argument that they think supports their conclusion in any opinion
they write. For at least two reasons, lawyers may not be under a
similar obligation to make only those arguments (or factual
allegations) in which the lawyers believe.
First, at least in many situations, a procedure in which the legal
representatives of all sides of a dispute make all the arguments for the
parties they represent that they think may be morally legitimate and
will inure to their clients' interests may be more likely to enable
judges to reach internally-correct legal conclusions than any other
system of legal-dispute processing (or at least may be sufficiently
likely to produce "legal truth" for the adoption of a system of zealous
advocacy to be consistent with our moral commitments). On my
account, the tendency of a particular legal-rights-dispute-processing
system to increase the probability that internally-correct legal-rights
conclusions will be reached favors its adoption because moral-rights
holders have a strong moral-rights-related interest in having their
legal rights enforced. And second, truth-considerations aside, a rule
allowing such zealous advocacy may be rendered morally legitimate
in our culture by the respect this aspect of the process manifests for
the parties to the legal-rights dispute. Thus, on my account, moralrights holders have a moral-rights-related interest (associated with
our duty of respect) in having the law-dispute-resolving process
arranged in a way that enables them to have every plausible argument
made that favors their legal-rights position and that recognizes their
ability to counter plausible legal-rights arguments made against them.
Overall, then, our society's general moral-rights commitments
obligate it to resolve legal-rights disputes through processes that
strike the internally-right balance between moral-rights holders'
"legal-product" and "pure-legal-process" interests. Our society's
decision to impose a duty of constrained zealous advocacy on its
lawyers65 may be consistent with its law-dispute-process-related
65. See Part II.B.3, infra, for a partial description of how the duty of zealous advocacy is
constrained.
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obligations.
I am therefore not troubled by the fact that lawyers are obligated
to behave in one sense "hypocritically." I do not know whether
Balkin and Levinson think that such authorized hypocrisy does
undermine my position. Their only statement that relates to this
possibility is cryptic: "Markovits's theory of law ...describes what
lawyers must simulate rather than what they must believe in order to
fulfill their professional obligations to their clients. '66 I should add
that even if Balkin and Levinson were right that our society's
approval of zealous advocacy is inconsistent with my conclusions
about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture, this would
damage my position only if they could do one of two things that they
have not done:
(1) devise an alternative account of our society's moral commitments
or their relationship to morally-legitimate legal argument that
discounted-fits its support of zealous advocacy better than my
accounts of these matters do; or
(2) show that the combination of this discounted non-fit and all
other discounted non-fits to my position is sufficiently serious to
justify the conclusions that-if my account is the best that one
can provide-our society is amoral and legal-rights conclusions
are up for negotiation in Balkin and Levinson's amoral sense of
that expression.
4. Law Teacher Pedagogy
Although Balkin and Levinson seem to acknowledge their
uncertainty on this issue, they give the impression that I believe that
law professors ought to or are obligated to refuse to teach any kind of
argument other than those arguments that I believe are morally
67
legitimate to use to discover what the law is in our culture. Of
course, I believe no such thing.
68 teach not only my
When I teach courses about what the law is,
own position on morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture but
66. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 546.
67. See id. at 549-51 and, especially, the reference to "a Markovitsian legal education" at
549.
68. I also teach one course on the economics of the common law and another on the
economics of environmental law, tax taw, antitrust law, and public-utility regulation that are
partially concerned with what the law ought to be as opposed to what the law is. Obviously, in
such courses, I teach many kinds of argument that are not relevant to determining what the law
is. The same conclusion applies to those portions of the course that I used to teach on
professional responsibility that dealt with various "ought" issues.
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a wide variety of alternative positions on this issue. I then analyze
various concrete legal-rights issues not only from my position on
morally-legitimate legal argument but from a number of other
jurisprudential perspectives. I proceed in this way for a variety of
reasons: in part because I recognize that my position may be wrong;
in part because I realize that, even if I am right, law students need to
be taught arguments that are wrong to enable them to counter such
arguments effectively; and in part because I acknowledge the
legitimacy of our current practice of obligating lawyers to make all
arguments whose use may be legitimate that will improve their
clients' certainty-equivalent trial outcomes.
However, although I agree with much of what Balkin and
Levinson say about the duty of law teachers to teach a wide variety of
allegedly morally-legitimate types of legal argument, I disagree with
two other points they may be making (and I emphasize "may") in
their section on legal pedagogy. First, at least unless these statements
are significantly qualified, I disagree with Balkin and Levinson's claim
that "law professors must be willing to teach their students how to
make the kinds of arguments that will be useful to them in
representing future clients" 69 and that law pedagogy must not
"disserve the student."7 0 I think that the obligations of a law teacher
are to his society and not to his students. This distinction will be
critical when, in one sense, the "interests" of the society and those of
the professor's students conflict. If I thought, for example, that
teaching students how statistical evidence can be "cooked" would
produce more harm by causing them to misuse statistical evidence
than good by enabling them to detect the misfeasance of others, I
would at least seriously consider the possibility that I was obligated
not to teach the relevant material.
Second, Balkin and Levinson apparently to the contrary
notwithstanding, I do not think that teaching students (1) that the use
of a particular argument to determine what the law is in our culture
will be morally legitimate if and only if it is consistent with the moral
commitments of our society and (2) how to trace through the concrete
implications of that "fact" is likely to "create a kind of schizophrenia"
in the students that "disserve[s] their legal education."71 There is
considerable evidence that lawyers suffer greatly from having to
69. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 550.
70. Id. at 549.
71. Id.
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make arguments on behalf of their clients in which or in whose
alleged force the lawyers do not believe. 72 I do not think that our
students' interests are disserved by increasing their intellectual
sophistication about this issue- by enabling them better to grasp the
roots of the problem and the possible justifications for their being put
in this position.
B. Our Society's or Its Informed Members' Beliefs About the
Obligations of Various Law-Role Players and the Actual Conduct of
the Role-Playersin Question
1. High-Court Judges and Lower-Court Judges
a. Precedent
Balkin and Levinson assert that in the United States "inferior
judges"-judges "whose decisions are reviewed by some higher
court" -are required "to follow the precedents of these higher courts,
even if they believe these precedents to be wrongly decided and
objectively
incorrect."7 3
More
specifically
and
somewhat
enigmatically, Balkin and Levinson assert that "a [federal] district
judge would be hard-pressed to ignore a 'binding' decision of a higher
court merely because it does not meet the judge's own adequacy
conditions for serious legal reasoning" and might even not be "free to
reject a preposterous opinion issued by the circuit court within which
74
her court is located."
I think that these statements give a misleading impression: the
various doctrines of precedent that a significant number of judges
support are not, taken together, so constraining as these sentences
suggest, and judges in the United States do not in practice follow
precedents with which they disagree to the extent that Balkin and
Levinson seem to be claiming they do. As Michael Sean Quinn
demonstrates in his contribution to this symposium, 75 among the wide
variety of theories of precedent that receive considerable support
from judges and courts within even a single American jurisdiction,
there are several that define the category of "binding precedent"
quite narrowly or hold that various categories of judges are not
72. For a useful summary of this evidence and discussion of its pedagogic implications, see
Ann L. lijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 524 (1998).
73. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 547.
74. Id.
75. See Quinn, supra note 38.
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absolutely bound to follow precedents that do have some binding

force. Moreover, as Quinn also recognizes, the binding force of
precedent under theories that assert that judges are bound to follow
only the "holdings" of specified types of prior decisions is significantly

undercut by both the difficulty of defining the concept of "a holding"
(e.g., when a given legal conclusion could have been based on a

variety of possibly-sound rationales) and the difficulty of identifying
the law-propositions on which a past court actually based its decision.
I hasten to add that my point is not that our "doctrine" of
precedent and our practice of precedent (about neither of which do I
possess systematic, reliable information) are perfectly consistent with
my position on our society's moral commitments. However, I do think
that, at both the doctrinal level and the practice level, the fit is better
than Balkin and Levinson's brief comments seem to suggest. Thus,

although the list of factors that various Supreme Court Justices in
Casey76 indicate influence the weight that is given to precedent in the

federal

courts

does

contain

two

prudential

factors

whose

consideration I find illegitimate, the eight other factors the Justices
list are all factors whose consideration I would say is morally

legitimate in our culture.
b. PrudentialArgument

I do not deny that American courts have given weight to
prudential considerations in ways that I think is inconsistent with our
culture's moral commitments. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has done so not only when reaching conclusions on legal-rights
issues but also when deciding whether to reach the merits of the case
before it. In fact, I fear that the current Court has let its decisions be
illegitimately influenced by prudential considerations to an unusually
great extent. 77
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The practice of precedent in the
federal courts was discussed in this case in a joint opinion written by Justice O'Connor and
joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter announcing the judgment of the Supreme Court as well
as in separate partially-concurring and partially-dissenting opinions written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. The statements made about these discussions in the text do not
distinguish among the points made in these various opinions. For a more detailed account and
assessment of this aspect of the various opinions in Casey, see MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra
note 12, at 73-74, 396 n.55, 397 n.56.
77. In particular, in my judgment, the argument that the case against the constitutionality
of affirmative action programs is strengthened by their (alleged) tendencies to increase the
politics of racial hostility and deter their supposed beneficiaries from developing their own
capacities is morally illegitimate (though it would clearly be legitimate for a legislator to
consider such possible tendencies when deciding whether a particular affirmative action
program was desirable, all things considered). For a critical discussion of the Supreme Court's

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:559

I also do not deny that many legal scholars-in fact, as I
indicated in the Introduction to this symposium, I fear an increasing
percentage of legal scholars-regard such practices to be not only
legitimate but also desirable. Some of these scholars (such as Philip
Bobbitt) accept the use of what I would call morally-illegitimate
prudential argument because they note that such arguments have
been given weight in practice and believe that legal practice is selflegitimating. Others including various members of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, some Legal Realists, and some Legal Pragmatists
accept such argument when it favors decisions they like because they
question the coherence of the concept of moral legitimacy or believe
that the kind of legitimacy that our culture's version of Liberal
Legalism supplies is undesirable. And still others (such as Alex Bickel
and his progeny) accept the legitimacy of a court's taking prudential
considerations into account when deciding whether to reach the
merits of a case in which, in their judgment, prudential considerations
make it unwise for the court to make an internally-correct decision: to
their mind, in such situations, it is preferable for a court not to reach
the merits than to make an internally-wrong decision for prudential
reasons or to make an internally-correct decision that would have
various undesirable political or social repercussions. Relatedly, some,
including Balkin and Levinson, believe that it is proper for judges to
be influenced by prudential considerations when deciding how to
explain their legal-rights conclusions-i.e., whether to write an
opinion that honestly reports the morally-legitimate argument that
justicizes their internally-correct legal-rights conclusion.
However, I am far from certain that most current law professors
accept the legitimacy of what I would regard as the illegitimate use of
prudential arguments to determine what the law is. Opposition to
prudentialism is manifest not only in the generally-positive reaction
legal academics gave to Gerald Gunther's quip that Bickel's position
amounts to "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time ' 7 8 but also
in the writings of those scholars who have challenged the proposition
that there are no internally-right answers to any legal-rights questions
whose answer is contestable or who have articulated or applied
Liberal Legalist or other types of moral-rights-oriented approaches to
legitimate legal argument. Believers in internally-right answers to

affirmative action cases, see MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 259-62.
78. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1,3 (1964).
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legal-rights questions are necessarily opposed to the use of those
prudential arguments that focus on the desirability of the effects of a
legal ruling from a personal-ultimate-value perspective that cannot be
said to underlie the statutory or constitutional provision being
interpreted since there is no internally-right way to choose the
personal-ultimate-value perspective to be applied in such cases. I
have already explained why those who believe that arguments of
moral principle dominate morally-legitimate legal argument will find
the use of many prudential arguments to discover what the law is
morally illegitimate. Nor should one assume that scholars who
sometimes consider
the
utilitarian
or allocative-efficiency
consequences of particular legal conclusions when deciding what the
law is accept the moral legitimacy of using all types of prudential
arguments to discover what the law is in all cases. Even on my view,
utilitarian and allocative-efficiency considerations are relevant to the
interpretation of statutes or constitutional provisions adopted to
secure (perhaps, inter alia) utilitarian or allocative-efficiency-related
goals. Moreover, since I believe that in some contexts (e.g., in many
tort-law contexts) the conclusion that an actor should have been able
to reach about the allocative efficiency of his choice is often relevant
to whether his choice violated someone's moral rights,79 my position
also does not imply the illegitimacy of using a certain kind of
allocative-efficiency analysis to resolve many moral-rights-related
legal-rights disputes.
To be honest, I do not know what the considered view of the
average lawyer or average American would be about the moral
legitimacy of using prudential arguments to determine what the law
is. Since most of the relevant individuals have not thought the issue
through in anything like a thorough fashion, one cannot ascertain
useful information on their considered conclusions by taking a simple
Gallup-type poll. Respondents will not provide the information one is
seeking until they had been informed about and deliberated on the
issue. However, I would not be surprised to discover that the
considered conclusion of many if not most lawyers or members of the
general community would be, in essence, that it is the province of
judges to discover the law rather than to create it and that the kinds
of prudential considerations whose influence I find morally

79. See Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency and Distributional Desirability of
Comparative Negligence: Some Partial and Preliminary Third-Best Analyses (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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illegitimate therefore should not play a role in the law-discovering
process.
c. Arguments of Moral Principle
(1) Beliefs
Balkin and Levinson contend that no or virtually no law
professor or legal philosopher agrees with my claim that in our
culture morally-legitimate legal argument is dominated by arguments
of moral principle. 0 Although Professor Robin West is personally
favorably disposed to the kind of antipositivism that Dworkin and I
espouse, her contribution to this symposium8 is premised on an only
slightly weaker variant of the assumption that Balkin and Levinson
make in this regard-viz., is premised on the assumption that this
kind of antipositivism has been largely unpersuasive not only to legal
academics but also to lawyers, judges, and others who have a position
on this issue.
I reject this assumption. In my admittedly-armchair empirical
judgment, many law professors do subscribe to a position on morallylegitimate legal argument that is at least very similar to mine. Their
antipositivism is manifest in the behaviors that I previously indicated
revealed their opposition to what I take to be the illegitimate use of
prudential arguments to discover what the law is: their agreement
with Gerald Gunther's criticism 82 of Alexander Bickel's proposal that
the Supreme Court not reach the merits of cases when it would be
imprudent to do so, 83 their opposition to the illegitimate use of
prudential arguments to decide cases on the merits, their insistence
that there are internally-right answers to legal-rights questions, their
concern about the implications of the claim that no such right answers
exist, and their use of arguments of moral principle to determine what
the law is. Some of these scholars argue for the relevance of
arguments of moral principle explicitly in abstract terms, 84 while
80. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 543-44. Although Balkin and Levinson's
comments to this effect relate to my position on taking legal reasoning seriously, their conflation
of this position with my position on morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture justifies the
second part of the text's claims.
81. See Robin West, Taking Moral Argument Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 499 (1999).
82. See Gunther, supra note 78, at 3.
83. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
84. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); David
A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and the Politics of
Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779 (1999).
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others reveal their belief that arguments of moral principle are
relevant to determining what the law is by using such arguments to
analyze concrete legal-rights issues. I hasten to add that academics
use arguments of moral principle not only when analyzing
"fundamental fairness" constitution-law issues but also when
analyzing common-law torts, contracts, and property cases-indeed,
even when analyzing legal-rights claims that do not derive from
independent moral rights. Thus, legal scholars are actually using
arguments of moral principle whenever they make reference to an
equitable principle in either a common-law or a statutory case-for
example, when they make use of the doctrine of laches, equitable
estoppel, or the principle that "no man shall profit from his own
wrongdoing." Indeed, judges and legal academics have argued that
this last principle renders internally correct the legal conclusion that a
beneficiary's having murdered his testator precludes him from
inheriting under the will of his victim either through disqualification
or through forfeiture despite the fact that the text of the controlling
statute makes no reference to this possibility.85 In fact, even some of
the law professors who claim to disagree with my conclusions about
the relevance of arguments of moral principle to the determination of
legal rights give arguments of moral principle the role I claim is
6
legitimate when performing legal-rights analyses themselves.
(2) Judicial Practice
Although Balkin and Levinson do not make this point explicitly,
they clearly believe that my conclusions about morally-legitimate
legal argument in our culture are undermined by the "fact" that few,
if any, judges give what I call arguments of moral principle the
dominant role in determining what the law is that I claim our society's
moral commitments obligate them to do. I agree that many judges do
not give arguments of moral principle sufficient weight when
determining extant legal rights: indeed, in the Introduction to this
symposium, I asserted and lamented what I take to be a rise in the
percentage of Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges who

85. The issue in question arose in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). The relevant
statute is New York State's Statute of Wills. For a discussion of the case, see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23 (1977). In essence, the majority in Riggs v. Palmer
and Dworkin are arguing that the relevant equitable principle limits the domain of the statute in
question.
86. For a detailed description of what I take to be an example of this phenomenon, see
MATrERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12, at 143-49.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:559

operate on the assumption that the morally-legitimate analysis of
what the law is is an arcane activity that ignores the moral rights at
stake in the cases to be decided. Nevertheless, I think that the fit
between my position on the legal relevance of arguments of moral
principle and actual judicial practice is far better than Balkin and
Levinson suppose.
Thus, explicit references to moral principles appear far more
often in judicial opinions than Balkin and Levinson's comments
imply. During many periods of American history prior to the New
Deal, both state-court judges and federal judges often cited the moral
principles at stake not only in the constitutional cases they considered
but also in various common-law and statutory cases. In my judgment,
at least a great deal of our common-law doctrine and virtually all of
our principles of equity directly reflect our society's moral-rights
commitments. The conduct of the federal courts during the Lochner
era is just one example of this phenomenon. Admittedly, many postNew-Deal judges reacted to Lochner and its progeny by avoiding
references to moral principles in their constitutional-law opinions.
However, others did not. Such references abound in many Warren
Court opinions, in the more recent opinions of various Supreme
Court Justices such as Thurgood Marshall, in state-court
constitutional-law opinions, in common-law tort, contract, and
property opinions, and in all kinds of cases in which equitable
principles have been brought to bear.
Moreover, even when judges do not make explicit reference to
the moral principles that are relevant to the internally-correct
resolution of the cases they are deciding, arguments of moral
principle or an understanding of the implications of our moral-rights
commitments for the proper way to analyze what the law is have had
a substantial impact both on the approach they have taken to
determining what the law is and on the legal-rights conclusions they
have reached. Thus, even when judges do not make explicit reference
to the jurisprudential relevance of the moral commitments of our
society, they often interpret legal texts, evaluate the relevance of
"original intent," decide how broad to make their historical inquiries,
construe structural arguments, interpret and weigh precedent and
other types of judicial practice, and respond to various kinds of
prudential arguments in ways that are consistent with my
understanding of our society's moral commitments and their
implications for legitimate legal argument. I also think that the
decisions that American courts have made in both constitutional-law
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cases and common-law cases are far more compatible with my
jurisprudential position than Balkin and Levinson suppose-indeed,
may fit my position better than any of its plausible alternatives 7

Although Balkin and Levinson do not make this claim, others

might argue that Balkin and Levinson's contention that neither legal
academics nor judges believe that arguments of moral principle play
the role in morally-legitimate legal argument that I ascribe to them is

confirmed by the fact-pointed out by several contributors to this
symposium-that "policy considerations" (by which I think they

mean utilitarian or allocative-efficiency considerations) often play a
substantial role in determining what the law is as well as by the fact

that academic commentators consider this practice to be perfectly
legitimate. I do not think that these facts disfavor my conclusion that
arguments of moral principle dominate morally-legitimate legal
argument. Since many statutes were passed to secure non-rightsrelated utilitarian goals, my account of morally-legitimate legal
argument in our culture implies that their interpretation should be

influenced by the utilitarian consequences of the various statutory
interpretations under consideration. And since, at least in some (say,

torts) contexts, moral-rights holders may be obligated (in effect) to
make the choices that they should conclude would be allocatively

efficient in the monetized sense of that term, 88 my conclusions about
legitimate legal argument will often imply that judges are obligated to

base their conclusions about the relevant parties' torts obligations on
appropriately constrained allocative-efficiency analyses (which would
87. For some accounts of the common law that appear to agree with this proposition
(though they disagree with each other and, to some extent, with my position on our society's
moral commitments), see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); and Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). For my own explanation of the moral basis of a Handtype formula for tort liability, see Markovits, supra note 79. In essence, I argue (1) that each
member of a liberal, rights-based society has an obligation to treat the ex ante equivalent-dollar
losses his possibly tortious conduct imposes on his potential "victims" as if these losses were his
own and (2) that this obligation implies that an injurer (victim) is at fault if the kind of
allocative-efficiency analysis that would be third-best-allocatively-efficient for him to execute
(given the cost to him of executing theoretical analyses of varying degrees of complexity and
accuracy and of collecting data of varying degrees of accuracy) would yield the conclusion that
his failure to avoid was ex ante allocatively inefficient. For a somewhat different view of the
moral basis of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998); and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpracticeand
the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649 (1998).
88. See Markovits, supra note 79.
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sometimes produce a decision-standard that closely resembles the
Hand formula for negligence). Moreover, my account of morallylegitimate legal argument implies as well that judges are obligated to
interpret ambiguous or open-textured language in any statutes that
were passed to maximize allocative efficiency in the way that would
result in their implementation's maximizing allocative efficiency.8 9
Indeed, my jurisprudential position implies as well that allocativeefficiency analysis is relevant to legal interpretation when the "law" in
question was designed both to increase allocative efficiency and to
promote one or more other goals. Admittedly, some academics who
reject my claim that arguments of moral principle dominate morallylegitimate legal argument do so because they think that "policy
considerations" are relevant and have been given weight by judges in
all contestable cases (not just in the subset of such cases to which I
have just referred) and that policy argument and legal argument are
indistinguishable. 90 However, I do not think that these academics'
opinions and the cases in which (on my account) policy arguments
have been given an inappropriate role constitute sufficiently serious
non-fits to defeat my position.
2. Impeachment Triers, Drafters and Enactors of Legislation and
Law-Creating Administrative Regulations, and Authors of Op-Ed
Pieces and Editorial Letters
Balkin and Levinson seem to be implying that members of the
legal community or of the society in general would reject the
implications of my conclusions about our society's moral
commitments for the obligations of these law-role players. I suspect
that any such misgivings they have reflect their misunderstanding of
the implications of my jurisprudential position for the obligations of
these role-players. My guess is that most law professors and lawyers
would agree with the conclusions I reach about these obligations and
that most members of the general public would do so as well if they
were given the opportunity to think through the relevant issues. For
example, I believe that the public at large understood that the
decision on whether to impeach or convict Clinton was not supposed
to be determined by whether the People or the members of the
relevant House wanted him to continue as President. Admittedly,
89. I think that fewer laws were designed solely to increase allocative efficiency than do
most of my law-and-economics colleagues.
90. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 533.
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however, I have no more evidence on our society's law-role beliefs in
general than do Balkin and Levinson.
3. Lawyers When Arguing in Court for Their Clients' Rights: The
Duty of Constrained Zealous Advocacy and Our General System of
Adjudication
Balkin and Levinson seem to believe that our society's belief in
the legitimacy of zealous advocacy and its lawyers' practice of zealous
advocacy do not fit my conclusions about morally-legitimate legal
argument in our culture. This claim is incorrect for several reasons.
First, it reflects their misunderstanding of the implications of my
position for the relevant duties of lawyers and the moral legitimacy of
our general system of adjudication. As I have already argued, my
position is basically compatible with lawyers' being obligated to make
all arguments that a reasonable jurist could possibly find morally
legitimate (or, perhaps, just socially acceptable) that would in practice
improve his client's legal prospects. I also acknowledge that in
deciding which arguments meet this test the lawyer is obligated to
recognize that his own views on morally-legitimate legal argument
may be different from his colleagues' (indeed, may even be wrong).
Balkin and Levinson's claim is also undermined by their exaggeration
of the extent to which the positive law of our culture "legally
obligates" lawyers to represent their clients zealously. Our positive
law provides only a limited authorization to lawyers to pursue their
clients' interests zealously when representing them in court: lawyers
may not mis-cite cases, have a duty to inform the court of precedents
that disfavor their legal position (or at least of precedents that clearly
cut against them), may not manufacture evidence, and may not
suborn perjury. Indeed, although this proposition is contestable, a
lawyer may also be obligated to withdraw from a case or notify the
judge when he knows that a witness has perjured himself in a way that
favors the lawyer's client.
Nevertheless, I must admit that in several respects our system of
adjudication fails to fulfill our society's moral commitments as I
understand them. More specifically, in my judgment, both the kind of
constrained zealous advocacy we regard as obligatory and the ability
of "the haves" to pick better lawyers and to devote more resources to
a case than the "have nots" are able to do often distort the
adjudicative process if the criterion for its assessment is its ability to
generate internally-correct legal rulings and accurate factual findings.

608
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Moreover, trial lawyers have told me that, at least in state courts, the
"search for legal truth" is also hindered by the tendency of lawyers to
argue for extreme legal conclusions in cases in which more moderate
conclusions are almost certainly internally correct. The fact that this
practice often does not serve the interests of such lawyers' clients (is
not required by the ethics of zealous advocacy) does not eliminate
this problem. The facts that lawyers are somewhat constrained by
codes of ethics, that a lawyer who makes a weak or illegitimate legal
argument in a case will find that his judges tend to undervalue the
good legal arguments he makes in the same case, that judges tend not
to pay attention in general to the legal arguments of lawyers who
develop a reputation for misrepresenting the law (and that such
reputations can be made far more quickly than they can be unmade),
and that juries tend to react hostilely to lawyers who .play fast and
loose with the facts all improve the performance of our adjudicative
process. But even when these ameliorative features of our system are
taken into consideration, I have no doubt that our society has failed
to fulfill its adjudicative-process obligations. In particular, I think that
our society's moral commitments obligate us to provide far more
judges, to supply far more legal aid to needful potential litigants, to
require our judges to be much more forceful in policing lawyer
conduct that does not promote the truth (not only misrepresenting
the law and the facts but also requesting improper trial delays or
changes in venue, taking unnecessarily long depositions, etc.), and to
permit and encourage our judges to take a more active role in
questioning witnesses and requesting evidence to be produced in
cases in which a party has inadequate legal counsel or is much worse
represented than is his opponent. However, although I regard such
non-fits as serious, I do not think that they defeat my conclusion that
ours is a liberal, rights-based society or my derivative conclusions
about morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture either by
themselves or in combination with all other extant non-fits.
4. Law-Teacher Pedagogy
I have already argued that Balkin and Levinson's apparent claim
that my conclusions about the moral character of our society and
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture are undermined by
their alleged inconsistency with the realities of law-school teaching
reflects their misanalysis of the pedagogic implications of my position.
Of course, the fact that my position does not imply the
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impropriety of law-school teachers' giving instruction in arguments
that I consider to be illegitimate or invalid leaves open the possibility
that much law teaching may be inconsistent with the pedagogic
implications of my understanding of morally-legitimate legal
argument in our culture. In fact, not only do I agree that much lawschool pedagogy does not fit my account of morally-legitimate legal
argument in our culture, that is one of the main facts I lamented in
my Introduction to this symposium. The problem is not that some or
many law-school teachers teach students approaches to analyzing
"what the law is" that I think are morally illegitimate in our culture, it
is that a significant and increasing percentage of law teachers deny
either or both the coherence of the concept of morally-legitimate
legal argument or the proposition that in our culture legal arguments
can be meaningfully characterized as being morally legitimate or
morally illegitimate.
This clear non-fit is one of the realities that led me to propose
this symposium. I would be the last to deny its existence or the
existence of analogous non-fits in legal scholarship.
C. The Explicability of Some of the Non-Fits That Tend to Undermine
My ConclusionsAbout Legitimate Legal Argument in Our Culture
I believe that Balkin and Levinson exaggerate the extent to
which my jurisprudential position would be rejected by those who
have considered the role that arguments of moral principle play in
morally-legitimate legal argument in our culture as well as the extent
to which judges behave in ways that are inconsistent with my claims.
However, I have no doubt that many would reject my position even
after giving it some consideration, that many judicial decisions both
about methodology and about the right answer to particular legalrights questions are inconsistent with it, and that many judges and
legal scholars whose analyses and conclusions do conform with my
jurisprudential conclusions reject my abstract position in favor of
alternatives that fit their behavior less well than does mine. Quite
clearly, I have a lot to explain.
I can offer two kinds of explanations for these non-fits that, I
hope, reduce the damage that they do to my position. The first is
"sociological." Law-school professors, lawyers, and judges are much
better at doing law than at describing what "doing law" entails. This
fact partly reflects the intellectual orientations of people who become
law professors, lawyers, and judges and partly reflects the fact that,
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unlike specialists in most academic fields, lawyers are not required to
and usually do not take courses in the "methodology" of their
"discipline." I have heard many law professors and several lawyers
and judges who carry out sophisticated legal analyses of the kind that
I think our society's moral commitments require give mechanical
accounts of what "doing law" entails that do not capture what they
do. In fact, these lawyers often bridle at my redescription of what they
are doing when they are "doing law."
The second explanation I would give of some non-fits is
historical. Law professors, judges, and lawyers are reluctant to
acknowledge the role that certain kinds of moral norms play in their
analyses of what the law is because they have drawn the wrong lesson
from Lochner and its progeny. Rather than concluding that courts
must not misidentify the moral norms to which our society is
committed when making use of them to discover what the law is
(must not conclude that ours is a laissez-faire libertarian, rights-based
society rather than a liberal, rights-based society), they concluded
that Lochner proves that judges should not use moral norms to
determine what the law is at all. In fact, this error partly reflects the
fact that lawyers are not trained in moral and political philosophy or
jurisprudence. This deficiency leaves them unable to distinguish the
kind of moral-rights-related moral norms I denominate "moral
principles" from the kind of moral-ought-related moral norms I
denominate "personal ultimate values." This error in turn leads them
to conclude incorrectly that the fact that personal ultimate values are
outside the law (except when the task is interpreting a statutory or
constitutional provision designed to effectuate them) implies that all
varieties of moral norms (moral principles as well as personal
ultimate values) are generally irrelevant to the determination of legal
rights.
I do think that the preceding explanations account for a
considerable amount of what I take to be the mistakes that those
trained in the law make about the abstract issue: what is the valid role
for arguments of moral principle to play in the process of identifying
extant legal rights. I also think that these explanations account for the
fact that, in practice, many law professors give arguments of moral
principle a far greater role in their scholarship than they are willing to
acknowledge, that many lawyers give more weight to arguments of
moral principle in their advice-giving, legal planning, and briefwriting than they admit, and that many judges are far more influenced
by arguments of moral principle than they concede. In my judgment,
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these explanations of such non-fits reduce the damage they do to my
claim that arguments of moral principle dominate morally-legitimate
legal argument in our culture.
D. The Importance of the Non-Fits Between My Conclusions on the
One Hand and Actual Legal Practiceand Others' ConsideredBeliefs
About Morally-Legitimate Legal Practiceon the Other
Balkin and Levinson's critique of my position on morallylegitimate legal argument is an armchair-empirical critique that
focuses on what they believe to be manifold non-fits between my
conclusions on the one hand and the considered beliefs of others
about morally-legitimate legal practice and actual legal practice on
the other. Parts II.A and II.B respectively argue that Balkin and
Levinson overestimate the extent of the relevant non-fits because
they misunderstand some of the implications of my position for the
obligations of various law-role players and because they operate on
(A) contestable assumptions about the considered judgments that
members of our society do or would have about these issues and (B)
contestable descriptions or characterizations of much of the law-roleplayer conduct in question. Part II.C then argues that the damage to
my position done by the various non-fits that actually do exist is
reduced by my ability to give plausible accounts of why people might
make the "mistakes" I believe these non-fits represent. This Part
argues that Balkin and Levinson exaggerate the extent to which my
position is undermined by evidence of non-fitting legal-roleobligation beliefs and non-fitting legal-role performances that cannot
be fully explained away.
My argument for the proposition that arguments of moral
principle dominate morally-legitimate legal argument is basically
conventionalist-i.e., is based on the assumption that moral
legitimacy is (within certain conceptual constraints) a question of fit.
But the fit that I think is relevant to the determination of morallylegitimate legal argument in a culture is a fit with all the prescriptive
moral beliefs and behaviors of that culture's members. This set of
beliefs and behaviors is far more extensive than the society members'
beliefs about law-role-player obligations and the conduct of the
society's law-role players. These facts imply that my position can be
defeated empirically in two ways: (1) by showing that the non-fits
between my conclusions about our society's moral commitments and
our society's prescriptive moral beliefs and conduct discounted by
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their explicability (hereinafter "discounted non-fits") are weightier
than the discounted non-fits associated with an alternative account of
our society's commitments or (2) by showing that, even though my
account of our society's commitments does "discounted fit" our
society members' beliefs and conduct better than does any alternative
account, the discounted non-fits to my position are sufficiently serious
to justify the conclusion that our society is amoral.
These conclusions weaken Balkin and Levinson's empirical
critique of my position in two ways. First, they create a possibility that
my conclusions may be justified even though they "discounted-fit"
our society's law-role beliefs and law-role performances worse than
does some alternative set of conclusions because they "discountedfit" our society's prescriptive moral beliefs and behaviors as a whole
better than does the alternative in question. (I hasten to add that
neither Balkin and Levinson nor anyone else has yet devised a
specific alternative to my position that "discounted-fits" the relevant
legal beliefs and conduct better than does mine.) Second, they
weaken Balkin and Levinson's empirical critique because, by
increasing the number of beliefs and behaviors that positions like
mine should ideally fit above the number of law-related beliefs and
behaviors that such positions should ideally fit, they make it possible
to conclude that our society is not amoral in the face of a
demonstration that its members' law-related conduct and beliefs
"discounted fit" any conceivable set of moral commitments so poorly
that a conclusion of amorality would be justified if the relevant fit
were exclusively to law-related beliefs and behaviors.
In essence, Balkin and Levinson have been misled in this regard
by their (in my view, incorrect) belief that legal practice is morally
self-legitimating (by their mistaken belief that law is autonomous in
this sense). Although I believe that (subject to some difficult-todefine constraints imposed by the very notion of morality) a society's
moral practices are self-legitimating, I claim that any subset of a
society's moral practices (such as its practice of determining what the
law is) is morally legitimate only if it is consistent with the society's
general moral commitments. In other words, in my view, like many
other legal scholars, Balkin and Levinson fail to recognize that,
although a society's legal practice is relevant to determining its moral
character (i.e., to determining whether it is rights-based, goal-based,
or amoral and, in the former two cases, the identity of the moral norm
or moral-norm combination it is committed to instantiating in its
relevant decisions), using a particular type of legal argument in a
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particular way to determine the content of existing law in a given
culture will be morally legitimate in that culture if and only if doing so
is consistent with that culture's general moral commitments.
I am fully aware that Balkin and Levinson may find this criticism
surprising. Both have been sympathetic to the Critical Legal Studies
movement, one of whose central tenets is that-in an ultimate-value
sense-legal practice does not justify itself. Indeed, most Critical
Legal Studies members believe that the rhetoric of Liberal Legalism
has made it more difficult to secure the reforms that they think ought
to be made. In fact, however, I am not contending that Balkin and
Levinson have advocated inconsistent positions: since "legitimacy" is
a matter of consistency with social practice whereas "justified-ness" is
a matter of moral desirability from a moral perspective whose appeal
does not depend on its fit to the relevant society's moral practice,
there is no inconsistency in maintaining that a society's legal practices
are self-legitimating though not self-justifying.

When I function as an economist or law-and-economics scholar, I
sometimes am certain that the conclusions I have reached are
"correct." My confidence in my answers to these questions reflects
the fact that I generated them through pure a priori argument or by
relying on empirical assumptions whose accuracy everyone would
admit.
I am not so certain that I am right about our society's moral
commitments or, therefore, about morally-legitimate legal argument
in our culture. Although I believe that my conclusions about these
issues are correct, I consider them to be contestable. I have listed
seven types of plausible objections to my positions in the Conclusion
of my basic contribution to this symposium. 91 Balkin and Levinson's
critique of my position seems to be making species of the third or the
fifth objection I distinguish: their paper sets forth an empirical
argument against either or both my claim that ours is a rights-based
society or my claim that our rights-based society is committed to
instantiating the liberal principle I have articulated. For the reasons
this section has articulated, I do not find their empirical case against
me persuasive.

91. See Legitimate Legal Argument, supra note 2, at 473-74.
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CONCLUSION

A scholar can often benefit from criticism even when he
concludes that it reflects a misunderstanding of his abstract position
or its more concrete implications, the critics' adoption of contestable
or inaccurate empirical assumptions, or the critics' misperception of
the relevance of certain facts to the scholar's position. I agree neither
with Balkin and Levinson's descriptions of my positions on taking
legal argument seriously and morally-legitimate legal argument in our
culture nor with their alleged empirical refutation of those positions.
However, I am indebted to them for providing me with an
opportunity to elaborate on and clarify my positions, to comment on
their view of various allegedly-relevant facts, and to point out that
even if their factual assertions were accurate the non-fits they would
have established would be less damaging to my positions than they
allege. Both I and this symposium have profited from Balkin and
Levinson's
Seriously."

Getting Serious About

"Taking

Legal Reasoning

